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I. Introduction
This essay is the second in a two-part series focused on our
nation’s invisible juvenile justice system—one that operates under
the legal radar as part of the U.S. Constitution’s Article III federal
district court system.1 The first publication, Article III
Adultification of Kids:
History, Mystery, and Troubling
Implications of Federal Youth Transfers,2 examined the
little-known practice of prosecuting children as adults in federal
courts. This paper will look at the related phenomenon of juvenile
delinquency matters that are filed and pursued in our nation’s
federal court system.3
To date, most scholarship evaluating youth prosecution has
focused on our country’s juvenile courts—venues established and
run in each of the individual states and territories. 4 The anomaly
of child prosecution under federal laws in our nation’s Article III
courts has received far less attention—particularly over the last
two decades.5 However, recent events suggest—and policies of the
current presidential
administration
demonstrate—federal

1. See NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE: PANEL ON
JUVENILE CRIME: PREVENTION, TREATMENT, AND CONTROL, 5–7, 155 (Joan McCord
et al. eds., 2001) (“The federal government has jurisdiction over a small number
of juveniles, such as those who commit crimes on Indian reservations or in
national parks, and it has its own laws to govern juveniles within its system.”).
2. Mae C. Quinn & Grace R. McLaughlin, Article III Adultification of Kids:
History, Mystery, and Troubling Implications of Federal Youth Transfers, 26
WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 523 (2020).
3. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2018) (“If an alleged juvenile delinquent is not
surrendered to the authorities of a State pursuant to this section, any proceedings
against him shall be in an appropriate district court of the United States.”).
4. See Quinn & McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 538 (“Although there was a
wave of writing about federal prosecution of youth at the turn of this century,
little scholarship or other examination of this phenomenon has happened in the
last twenty years.”).
5. Id.
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apprehension and prosecution of youth is a subject worthy of
greater study.6
This paper sheds further light on delinquency cases—matters
filed in federal courts by the United Stated Department of Justice
against children who allegedly engaged in wrongdoing worthy of
Article III intervention.7 Part II covers the shared common law
approach to youth prosecution that existed in the early years of our
country in both state and federal courts. Under the common law,
children age seven and up were eligible for prosecution like adults.8
There were no specialized courts to deal with such matters nor
youth-only dispositions.9 Instead, children convicted of criminal
acts, like their adult counter parts, faced the full range of
penalties—including possible execution.10
Part III describes the specialized juvenile court movement at
the start of the 1900’s that swept the United States, resulting in
every state and territory—other than the federal system—creating
its own child-centered court systems.11 It further explains that for
more than fifty years U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence has
focused almost exclusively on the constitutionality of state juvenile
court practices, responding largely to localized developments in

6. See id. (“Few realize that youth have faced prosecution, transfer, and
adult sentencing in our federal court system since our nation’s founding.”).
7. See 18 U.S.C. § 5031 (2018) (“‘[J]uvenile delinquency’ is the violation of
a law of the United States committed by a person prior to his eighteenth birthday
which would have been a crime if committed by an adult . . . .”).
8. See Deanie C. Allen, Trying Children As Adults, 6 FAULKNER L. REV. 27,
29 (2002) (“Children under seven could not be held accountable for the
commission of a crime and some children under fourteen could be shown
deferential treatment due to a lack of maturity or lack of capacity to understand
the consequences of their actions”) (citations omitted).
9. See id. at 31 (noting the first juvenile court system in the United States
was established in Illinois on July 1, 1899 by the Juvenile Court Act); see also
Illinois Juvenile Court Act, 1899 Ill. Laws, 131, § 21 (codified as amended at 705
Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 405, 1–2) (citations omitted).
10. See Allen, supra note 8, at 28 (“[T]here are also reports from as early as
the 1700's of children as young as twelve and fourteen being killed or mutilated
for their complicity in a murder”) (citations omitted).
11. See id. at 32 (“By 1925 all but two of the states had followed [Illinois] and
passed laws establishing separate juvenile court systems”) (citations omitted); see
also Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 104–22 (1909)
(describing state-level juvenile court innovations and calling for a broader
embrace of the Chicago juvenile court model).
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child prosecution in its youth justice decisions. 12 This paper further
catalogs a range of policy developments relating to child
defendants and delinquency case processing, which are also largely
taking place on the local and state levels.13 It describes a modern
movement that seeks to constantly improve juvenile courts, reduce
overrepresentation of BIPOC youth, and implement emerging best
practices.14
Part IV then turns to federal prosecution of children. It offers
little-known insights into early federal juvenile cases, including
case types and defendant populations.15 It then examines the
federal statutory and rules-based framework that was ultimately
constructed to perpetuate the practice of federal prosecution of
children accused of wrongdoing.16 This section also looks at the
policies and practices of the Department of Justice over time as
they have related to child crime cases. Part IV offers critiques of
such activities, arguing many federal delinquency practices have
been out of step with emerging modern juvenile justice approaches
that account for adolescent brain science, the vulnerability of
youth, and the rehabilitative power of ongoing connection with
families and communities.17

12. See SHAY BILCHIK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQ.
PREVENTION, JUVENILE JUSTICE:
A CENTURY OF CHANGE 3 (1999),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/178995.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2020) (“In
a series of decisions beginning in the 1960’s, the U.S. Supreme Court required
that juvenile courts become more formal—more like criminal courts”)
[https://perma.cc/4FQG-YK4D]; see also id. at 7 (outlining a series of Supreme
Court cases impacting juvenile courts).
13. Infra note 55.
14. Infra note 115.
15. See Quinn & McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 539–40 (describing
approaches to federal youth prosecution prior to passage of the 1938 Federal
Juvenile Delinquency Act).
16. See William S. Sessions & Faye M. Bracey, A Synopsis of the Federal
Juvenile Delinquency Act, 14 ST. MARY'S L. J. 509, 509–10 (1983) (noting
Congress passed the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act in 1938).
17. See, e.g., Richard Bonnie & Elizabeth Scott, The Teenage Brain:
Adolescent Brain Research and the Law, 22 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI.
158, 160 (2013), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0963721412471678
(last visited Sept. 25, 2020) (“In combination, behavioral and neurobiological
research on adolescence have played an important role in advancing policies that
recognize the immaturity of young offenders in responding to juvenile crime.”)
[perma.cc/CQK7-4KFA].
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In Part V, we provide some areas of particular concern and
further evaluation. For instance, we examine the involvement of
both Native and immigrant youth in the federal delinquency
system and urge heightened awareness of their plight, especially
as we experience ramped up federal law enforcement presence in
our local communities.18 We also discuss the multilayered,
multijurisdictional
approach
to
youth
detention
and
confinement.19 This system largely escapes public attention or
discussion among academics, advocates, or policy makers.20 The
COVID-19 public health crisis provides further reason to demand
additional information about such settings and the numbers of
youth serving time—potentially until their twenty-sixth
birthday—related to federal delinquency charges.21
18. See, e.g., William Adams et al., Tribal Youth in the Federal Justice
System,
URBAN
INST.,
JUST.
POL’Y
CTR.
x–xi
(2011),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/234549.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2020)
(“[Eighty-two percent] of entering [Indian Country] juveniles entrants had been
adjudicated delinquent compared to only 38% of entering non-[Indian Country]
juveniles who were adjudicated delinquent”) [perma.cc/WXB2-3UTK]; but see id.
at x (noting poorly reported data and difficulty distinguishing between children
adjudicated as adults and children adjudicated as delinquents); see also Operation
Legend: Update on Federal Charges, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Sept. 3, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/operation-legend-update-federal-charges
(last
visited Oct. 24, 2020) (reporting on more than 2000 arrests by federal officials in
less than a week as part of Operation Legend, a Trump-administration initiative
that targets select urban areas with increased federal law agency sweeps, raids,
and enforcement) [perma.cc/4BDW-X9WG].
19. Federal juvenile delinquency dispositions may also involve periods of
probation or post-release supervision, which present concerns of reincarceration.
See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL30822, JUVENILE DELINQUENTS AND
FEDERAL JUVENILE LAW: THE FEDERAL JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ACT AND RELATED
MATTERS 15 (2018) (“The court may later revise or revoke a juvenile’s probation
and order the juvenile’s detention for violation of his probation conditions.”).
20. NANCY RODRIGUEZ, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., A MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS OF
JUVENILE COURT PROCESSES: THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMUNITY CHARACTERISTICS iii
(June 30, 2008), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/223465.pdf (last
visited Sept. 25, 2020) (“Unfortunately, few studies of juvenile court processes
have relied on cross-jurisdictional data to examine how court context influences
juvenile court decisions and only one study to date has addressed how community
characteristics where juveniles reside directly and indirectly impact juvenile
court outcomes.”) [perma.cc/9MFW-SHE7].
21. See Letter from Act 4 Juvenile Justice to Mitch McConnell, Senate
Majority
Leader,
et
al.
2
(June
9,
2020),
http://act4jj.org/sites/default/files/ckfinder/files/OJJDP%20Signon%20Letter%20June%202020%20FINAL.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2020)
(urging Congress to address concerns posed by COVID-19 in youth detention
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In the end, we urge further data collection and study to help
rethink—and
potentially
dismantle—federal
delinquency
practices. Federal delinquency proceedings duplicate adjudicative
systems already largely available in the states. 22 In addition,
federal district courts are simply ill-equipped to deal with the
special needs of children, to stay abreast of emerging best practices
for youth and families, or to ensure kids are provided with the
justice and support that they deserve.23
II. Common Law Approach to Youth Crime—Shared State and
Federal History
At common law, it was generally presumed that children
under seven did not possess the mens rea necessary to be convicted
of a crime.24 For those between the ages of seven and fourteen, that
presumption was rebuttable.25 And “children over age fourteen
possessed the requisite capacities for criminal intent.”26 Thus,
youth between the ages of seven and fourteen who did not
successfully advance an infancy-type defense, and those age
fourteen to seventeen, were subject to all of the same penalties as
adults including, in some instances, execution.27
These rules came to the United States through the English
colonies, and persisted as state legal systems, and a separate
centers, some of which report up to 50% of inhabitants testing positive)
[perma.cc/ZRL4-9N7Q].
22. See DOYLE, supra note 19, at 4 (stating juvenile violations of state law
are frequently violations of federal law, as well).
23. See BILCHICK, supra note 12, at 1 (“Certainly, there are areas in the
juvenile justice system that need improvement.”); but see id. (“Still, the roots of
the juvenile justice system remain strong and need to be supported by all those
committed to improve the lives of our children.”).
24. See Kim Taylor-Thompson, States of Mind/States of Development, 14
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 143, 145 (2003) (outlining the common law “rule of sevens”
that was traditionally applicable in the case of youth crime).
25. Id.
26. Id. (noting that in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, “courts would
take age into consideration in evaluating the child's conduct . . . [i]n limited
instances[.]”).
27. See id. at 145–46 (recounting how “some children between the ages of ten
and twelve were executed in early America”); see also Mack, supra note 11, at 106
(“The majesty and dignity of the state demanded vindication for infractions from
both [the adult and the minor] alike.”).
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federal court structure, formed.28 Thus, at the time Article III to
the U.S. Constitution was ratified in 1788, and national-level trial
courts were created with the First Judiciary Act of 1789,29 youth
were generally seen as proper subjects for prosecution and handled
in the same courts as adults charged with crimes.30 This thinking
continued in the United States through much of the 1800s.31
For instance, in 1881 the South Carolina Supreme Court
upheld the conviction of Lawrence Toney, described as “a
well-grown boy, apparently at least over twelve years” but not yet
age fourteen.32 He and two of his brothers had been charged with
malicious trespass for allegedly entering the cow pen of a neighbor
by the name of D.E. Keels,33 physically striking Keels’ cow, and
then allowing their dogs to attack the larger animal.34 While
Lawrence admitted that his two dogs bit at the cow, he did not
direct them to do so.35 In addition, Lawrence claimed the entire
incident was an effort to return the cow to Keels after it had
escaped from the pen.36
The Court not only rejected Lawrence Toney’s argument that
the jury needed to be told he possessed actual malice to be

28. See Lara A. Bazelon, Exploding the Superpredator Myth: Why Infancy is
the Preadolescent’s Best Defense in Juvenile Court, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 159, 168–70
(2000) (describing the development of the “rule of sevens” for criminal culpability
for youth, including its English common law origins and embrace by Sir Matthew
Hale of the King’s Bench in the seventeenth century).
29. Judith Resnik & Kevin Walsh, Common Interpretation: Article III,
Section
2,
NAT’L
CONST.
CTR.:
INTERACTIVE
CONSTITUTION,
https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/interpretation/articleiii/section/203 (last visited Aug. 29, 2020) [perma.cc/26V2-G7YZ].
30. BARBARA DANZIGER FLICKER, INST. FOR JUD. ADMIN. & A.B.A., STANDARDS
FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE: SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS 29 (2d ed. 1982) (“Prior to the
nineteenth century, children who committed crimes were handled by the same
institutions as adults.”).
31. See Bazelon, supra note 28, at 171 (reporting that in the late 1800’s social
reformers began to argue “it was both unjust and counterproductive to expose
impressionable and inherently redeemable youngsters to the harshness of the
adult criminal justice system”); see generally Mack, supra note 11, at 107–08.
32. State v. Toney, 15 S.C. 408, 410 (1881).
33. See id. at 410 (referring to Keels as “the prosecutor” throughout the
opinion).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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convicted, but held his young age did not require relief either.37
Applying the common law rule of sevens to the case, the Court
concluded no further proof or instruction was needed on the
question of capacity.38 Instead, it held, the jury likely determined
Lawrence was old enough “to discern between good and evil.”39
The federal system also automatically processed youth as
adults in U.S. district courts during this period, as can be seen from
the 1893 case of Allen v. United States.40 In Allen, a
fourteen-year-old from Arkansas, described as a “colored boy,” was
tried for shooting and killing an older teen, described as a “white
boy,” on the lands of the Cherokee Nation.41 Because the killing
occurred on a Native American reservation, as will be further
discussed below, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Arkansas had jurisdiction.42 After being convicted by a federal jury
at his trial, Alexander Allen was sentenced to death.43 Like Toney,
he challenged the jury instructions relating to youth, mens rea, and
culpability.44 The Supreme Court held that some instructions
relating to youth should have been given, even though Alexander
had just passed his fourteenth birthday.45 But it did not reverse on
37. Id. at 413–14.
38. See id. at 414 (stating “this principle, when enforced most rigidly, would
not have demanded of the presiding judge in this case to have charged the jury
that there was no proof before them rebutting this presumption”).
39. Id.
40. See Allen v. United States, 150 U.S. 551, 559 (1893) (holding the state
bore the burden of proof to show a fourteen-year-old had the capacity to form the
requisite mens rea to commit homicide).
41. Id. at 552.
42. See id. at 551–52 (noting the shooting took place “in the Cherokee
Nation, some three or four miles from Coffeyville, Kansas”).
43. Id. at 551.
44. Id. at 557–58.
45. See id. at 559.
[I]f the circumstances rendered that fact significant; and since in this
case the presumption of the lack of accountability had obtained until
within two months of the homicide, if the defendant's own statement
as to his age is to be accepted, an instruction which treated him as
having been under the weight of full accountability three years longer
than was the fact may have tended to weaken the effect upon the minds
of the jurors which his youth might have otherwise had, and to which
the humanity of the law regards him as entitled.
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that ground, finding a stronger argument for relief in the lower
court’s botched consideration of Alexander’s self-defense claim.46
Despite this remand, the Court did not preclude Alexander’s
continued federal prosecution or death sentence exposure.47 In
fact, after twice more returning to the Supreme Court to seek
relief, in 1895 and 1896, Alexander Allen was convicted for a final
time and, shockingly, executed for childhood conduct.48
III. Emergence of State Juvenile Courts and Supreme Court’s
Related Jurisprudence
The Allen trilogy and tragedy, in some ways, serves as a
turning point. While Alexander was repeatedly appealing to the
Supreme Court, around the country states were parting ways with
the federal system’s approach to child prosecution.49 By the start
of the last century, the U.S. juvenile justice story became one

46. Id. at 560–61. Allen is, in fact, best known for the genesis of the term
“‘Allen’ charge.” See Griffith v. State, 686 S.W.2d 331, 332 n.1 (Tex. App.—
Houston 1985) (describing Alexander Allen’s case as “extraordinary”).
47. Allen v. United States, 150 U.S. 551, 561 (1893).
48. See Allen v. United States, 157 U.S. 675, 681 (1895) (overturning Allen’s
conviction in the lower court for a second time and ordering a new trial); see also
Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 502 (1896) (affirming Allen’s third conviction
in the lower court). Interestingly, in the 1895 decision, the ages of the youth
involved in the incident had somehow changed. In the 1893 decision Allen’s age
was described “some two months older than 14 years,” while his victim was
reportedly 18 years old. Allen, 150 U.S. at 552. In 1895, the Court described Allen
as “about 15 years old” and the victim “about 17 years old.” Allen, 157 U.S. at 675.
Reversing the conviction for another new trial based upon a faulty self-defense
instruction, the Court referred to the incident as a “difficulty . . . between boys.”
Id. at 678. The 1896 decision did not reference Allen’s age in any way. But in
upholding Allen’s conviction, the Court reiterated that his victim was white. See
Allen, 478 U.S. at 493–94 (“This was a writ of error to a judgment of the circuit
court of the United States for the Western district of Arkansas sentencing the
plaintiff in error to death for the murder of Philip Henson, a white man, in the
Cherokee Nation of the Indian Territory.”). This time, his conviction was upheld.
Id. at 502. See also Reginald Betts, What Break Do Children Deserve, 128 YALE L.
F. 743, 757–58 (2019) (recounting the tragic unsuccessful efforts by Allen to be
spared the death penalty for actions committed while he was a young teen).
49. See BILCHIK, supra note 12, at 2 (“As early as 1825, the Society for the
Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency was advocating the separation of juvenile and
adult offenders. Soon, facilities exclusively for juveniles were established in most
major cities.”).
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focused on states and localities.50 This was due to the emergence of
localized special venues for criminal cases involving children—
what we today refer to as juvenile courts.51
A. Juvenile Courts as Specialized Venues to Address Child
Wrongdoing
Judge Julian Mack of Chicago is often credited with launching
the country’s first juvenile court in 1899.52 Chicago’s Juvenile
Court, created by state law, had specialized features that
ultimately were replicated by other jurisdictions, including special
youth-centered probation staff and a focus on rehabilitation rather
than punishment.53 By 1925, every state and territory in the
United States, save two, established their own juvenile court
systems.54 These courts generally had exclusive jurisdiction over
youth under age eighteen charged with criminal acts55—from
50. See id. (articulating how states began to establish their own juvenile
courts in the early twentieth century).
51. See id. (“During the next 50 years, most juvenile courts had exclusive
original jurisdiction over all youth under age 18 who were charged with violating
criminal laws . . . [and] [u]nlike the criminal justice system . . . the juvenile court
controlled its own intake.”).
52. See SOL RUBIN, CRIME AND JUVENILE DELINQUENCY; A RATIONAL
APPROACH TO PENAL PROBLEMS 77 (3d ed. 1970) (noting specialized youth focused
courts had been operating around the country largely in the form of municipal
and police courts, despite that “[i]t is generally accepted that the first juvenile
court was the Chicago court, established in 1899”); see also, e.g., In re Moses, 13
Abb. N. Cas. 189, 1883 WL 12790, at *196 (N.Y. Gen. Term. 1883) (reviewing
habeas corpus application of thirteen-year-old child who was prosecuted in the
New York City police court for vagrancy and remanded to the House of Refuse for
the Reformation of Juvenile Delinquents). But see In Re Courts for Trial of
Infants, 3 Pa. D. 753, 1893 WL 3154, at *2 (Pa. Ct. of Oyer and Terminer and
Gen. Jail Delivery Jan. 1, 1893) (finding unconstitutional local efforts to create
special confidential court setting for youth charged with crimes, in part declaring
“[s]ome of the worst criminals known to the law are persons under sixteen years
of age”).
53. See FLICKER, supra note 30, at 31–32 (listing the contributions of the
Illinois Juvenile Court Act to developing the future of juvenile court systems).
54. See BILCHIK, supra note 12, at 2 (“By 1910, 32 States had established
juvenile courts and/or probation services. By 1925, all but two States had followed
suit.”).
55. Some states treated sixteen and seventeen-year-olds as adults and
excluded them from juvenile court jurisdiction. This lower age cut off for some
states remained in place until recent years when “raise the age” advocacy efforts
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low-level thefts to homicides—though in some limited instances
some such matters could be prosecuted in adult courts where the
youth would face adult sanctions.56
Judge Mack described juvenile courts as different from
criminal courts as they were not arenas of conflict.57 Instead, they
employed non-adversarial programs of guidance for children gone
astray to “save [them] from downward career.”58 Children, he and
other proponents argued, were fundamentally good and amenable
to redirection and change.59 Therefore, it was ineffective and
inappropriate to incarcerate them with adults.60
On the other hand, due process was seen by juvenile court
proponents as too strict and formal, injecting an air of criminality
into proceedings that were designed to be collaborative.61 Thus
hearings in juvenile courts were considered civil rather than
criminal, and children were declared “delinquent” rather than
“guilty,” a judgment on status rather than culpability.62
succeeded. See Brian Evans & Jeree Thomas, 2019 Legislative Reforms After
Raise the Age, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUST. (May 20, 2019),
http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/2019/item/2019-legislative-reformsafter-raise-the-age (last visited Sept. 25, 2020) (reporting that in the last six years
five states have passed laws to raise the age youth subject to juvenile court
jurisdiction to eighteen and there are only four states with lower ages of juvenile
court jurisdiction) [perma.cc/8UCJ-HTNX].
56. See BILCHIK, supra note 12, at 2 (“Children as young as 7, however, could
stand trial in criminal court for offenses committed and, if found guilty, could be
sentenced to prison or even to death.”).
57. See Mack, supra note 11, at 122 (describing juvenile courts as being
“curative,” and aiming “to prevent the children from reaching that condition in
which they have to be dealt with in any court”).
58. Id. at 120.
59. See, e.g., id. (discussing feasible procedures, which could have significant
resulting effects on a child’s character).
60. See id. at 117 (pointing out the benefits of juvenile court systems).
61. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1967).
The rules of criminal procedure were therefore altogether inapplicable.
The apparent rigidities, technicalities, and harshness which they
observed in both substantive and procedural criminal law were
therefore to be discarded. The idea of crime and punishment was to be
abandoned. The child was to be ‘treated’ and ‘rehabilitated’ and the
procedures, from apprehension through institutionalization, were to be
‘clinical’ rather than punitive.
62. See id. at 15 (“[S]ociety’s role was not to ascertain whether the child was
‘guilty’ or ‘innocent,’ but ‘[w]hat is he, how has he become what he is, and what
had best be done in his interest and in the interest of the state to save him from
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These features, in the service of “child saving,” thus justified
abandonment of constitutional safeguards in favor of flexibility
and informality.63 The courts were run by “a fatherly judge” whose
job was to “touch the heart and conscience of the erring youth”
through friendly conversation and “paternal advice and
admonition.”64 But as will be further discussed, “childhood” and
“youth” were not singularly defined by age or evaluated as a
monolithic category in the juvenile court movement.65 Some young
people—usually those seen or constructed as white—were
considered more “redeemable” than others.66
In addition, youth advocates and others began to critique the
nation’s juvenile courts for using the concept of parens patriae to
take control of children brought before the court.67 Their supposed
rehabilitative interventions were also debunked for lacking basis
or efficacy.68 And youth were being sanctioned in significant ways
that deprived them of liberty without being afforded the same legal

a downward career.’” (quoting Mack, supra note 11, at 120)).
63. See BILCHIK, supra note 12, at 2 (“[J]uvenile courts sought to turn
delinquents into productive citizens—through treatment”); see also Robin
Sterling Walker, Fundamental Unfairness: In re Gault and the Road not Taken,
72 MD. L. REV. 607, 610 (2013) (describing the “child saving” mentality that drove
the original juvenile courts).
64. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 26.
65. See Walker, supra note 63, at 623 (explaining that Black children were
often excluded to avoid “waste of resources and a debasement of whites”).
66. See id. at 660–76 (critiquing racialized constructions of youth that have
influenced policing and juvenile court practices); see also Mae C. Quinn, From
Turkey Trot to Twitter: Puberty, Purity, and Sex Positivity, 38 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 51, 57 (2014) (describing nation’s historic preoccupation with
protecting the “purity” of “white” girls while criminalizing Black males).
67. See MICHAEL WILLRICH, CITY OF COURTS: SOCIALIZING JUSTICE IN
PROGRESSIVE ERA CHICAGO 210 (Cambridge U. Press 2003) (discussing that Boys’
Court judges had full jurisdiction over juvenile adults); see also People v.
Lattimore, 199 N.E. 275, 276 (Ill. 1935) (denying juvenile court original
jurisdiction in criminal cases); see also Susan L. Brody, Notice to Minors under
the Illinois Juvenile Court Act: An Anomaly of Due Process, 36 DEPAUL L. REV.
343, 348 (1987) (explaining the lack of due process for juveniles under the parens
patriae system).
68. See Daniel Ross, Rethinking the Road to Gault: Limiting Social Control
in the Juvenile Court, 1957–1972, 98 VA. L. REV. 425, 437–38 (2012) (recounting
concerns of various reformers during the 1950’s and 1960’s, such as Paul Tappan,
who argued post-adjudicative rehabilitative interventions were overly intrusive
and failed to deliver meaningful treatment or assistance).
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protections provided to adults, including by being transferred to
adult court in some instances.69
B. Kent, Gault & Their Progeny: Balancing Paternalism with
Due Process
Although racial bias was not challenged,70 other juvenile court
concerns percolated into litigation in the 1960’s.71 This resulted in
a series of cases that went to the U.S. Supreme Court to push
protections for children in state and local juvenile court systems.72
The first was Kent v. United States.73
In Kent, decided in 1966, the actions of the District of
Columbia Juvenile Court were challenged.74 That court
69. See WILLRICH, supra note 67, at 210 (“‘Juvenile adults,’ as the sociologists
called them, occupied a kind of legal limbo. They were too old for the ‘wise
paternalism’ of the juvenile court, yet too young to assume the full rights and
obligations of adult male citizens.”). Beyond the scope of this paper is youth
prosecution for non-criminal actions such as truancy or alleged sexual
misconduct. This phenomenon is an ongoing concern. However, because there
does not appear to be a federal court system analog, it will not be recounted
addressed here. For more on this subject as a historical matter, see, e.g., Quinn,
supra note 66, at 74 (describing overbroad laws at the turn of the last century
used to police and prosecute youth seen as “wayward”); see also Cheryl Hicks,
TALK WITH YOU LIKE A WOMAN: AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN, JUSTICE, AND REFORM
IN NEW YORK, 1890–1935 12–19 (2010) (recounting, among other concerns, the
problem of New York courts taking custody of Black girls when their families
merely sought advice and assistance to address youthful experimentation or
sexual activity on the part of their daughters). For more on modern concerns
relating to prosecution of status offenders, see, e.g., A.B.A., REPRESENTING
JUVENILE STATUS OFFENDERS (2010) (compiling a collection of essays outlining
concerns regarding modern policing and prosecution practices regarding status
offenses, such as truancy).
70. See Walker, supra note 63, at 622–33 (critiquing 1960’s juvenile court
legal challenges for failing to sufficiently account for the experiences of Black
youth or raise racial justice claims, resulting in a lost opportunity).
71. See Tamar R. Birckhead, Juvenile Justice Reform 2.0, 20 BROOK.
J. L. & POL'Y 15, 39–40 (2011) (describing Kent, Gault, and In re Winship as the
trio of cases that insisted upon due process for juvenile court proceedings).
72. See id. at 40 (“Together these cases reflected the view that . . . juvenile
courts should be concerned with what a child does, rather than who a child is.”)
(emphasis in original).
73. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561–62 (1966) (holding a young
person in juvenile court is constitutionally entitled to counsel and must be
afforded an opportunity for a hearing).
74. Id. at 551.
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transferred Kent to adult court for prosecution for a series of
violent crimes without first affording him a meaningful hearing at
which he could challenge the evidence supporting such an
application.75 The Court agreed that a young person facing the
significant consequence of rejection by the juvenile court, and
possible imprisonment as an adult, needed to be afforded due
process, to include notice of the proof supporting transfer and an
opportunity for counsel to contest it.76
Juvenile court trial rights were essentially born on May 15,
1967, when the Supreme Court issued its In re Gault decision.77
Gerald Gault was found delinquent and committed to an Arizona
state institution for up to six years without being provided an
attorney, informed of his right to remain silent, served a written
factual basis for his charges, or given an opportunity to confront
his accuser.78 The Court, quoting itself from the previous year, held
that a juvenile court trial must “measure up to the essentials of
due process and fair treatment[,]” and that Gault’s treatment in
the Arizona juvenile court system fell far short.79
The Court, while addressing the arbitrariness that had
evolved in such venues, agreed with the fundamental goals of the
juvenile courts.80 But it believed that those goals would “not be
impaired by constitutional domestication.”81 Thus, pursuant to
Gault, children in juvenile court are now constitutionally
75. Id. Interestingly, given the District of Columbia’s unique structure as a
territory, the “adult” court in question was the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia. See Quinn & McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 527–28 (detailing the
factual background of Kent).
76. Kent, 383 U.S. at 565; see also Quinn & McLaughlin, supra note 2, at
526–30 (describing the facts and findings in Kent).
77. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967) (declaring the rights of a child in a
delinquency proceeding); see also WILLRICH, supra note 67, at 213–14 (describing
the timeline and impact of juvenile due process rights cases).
78. Gault, 387 U.S. at 10.
79. See id. at 30 (“We do not mean to indicate that the hearing to be held
must conform with all the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual
administrative hearing; but we do hold that the hearing must measure up to the
essentials of due process and fair treatment” (quoting Kent v. United States, 383
U.S. 541, 562 (1966))).
80. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 19 (“Departures from established principles of due
process have frequently resulted not in enlightened procedure, but in
arbitrariness.’’).
81. Id. at 23.
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guaranteed notice of charges,82 assistance of counsel,83 ability to
confront and cross-examine accusers,84 and privilege against
self-incrimination.85
Over the next few years, the Court further clarified trial
process rights guaranteed to youth in juvenile court. For instance,
while it held that state juvenile courts need not provide youth with
jury determinations in connection with findings of guilt,86 the proof
beyond a reasonable doubt standard did apply to child prosecution
matters.87 In re Winship involved a youth who allegedly stole a
woman’s purse from a locker in New York. 88 Although New York
juvenile court cases, like all others around the country, are
considered civil in nature rather than criminal, the Court held that
the highest burden of proof available at law still applied in such
cases.89 “[F]undamental fairness” with “an emphasis on factfinding
procedures” was key.90
C. Modern State Level Shifts, Localized Movements, and Best
Practices Focus
In the wake of these decisions, the American Bar Association
along with the Institute of Judicial Administration, supported the
development of Juvenile Justice Standards.91 The drafting project
was hosted at New York University School of Law, beginning in
1971, and involved hundreds of juvenile judges, youth justice
82. Id. at 33–34.
83. Id. at 41.
84. Id. at 57.
85. Id. at 55.
86. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971) (“[O]ne cannot
say that in our legal system the jury is a necessary component of accurate
factfinding.”).
87. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (holding that due process
requires juvenile proceedings be proved beyond a reasonable doubt).
88. Id. at 360.
89. Id. at 366.
90. Id. at 363; see also McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 543 (describing the standard
from Winship as having an “emphasis on factfinding procedures”).
91. See FLICKER, supra note 30, at 15 (explaining that the Institute of
Judicial Administration initiated the project in 1971 and was joined by the
American Bar Association in 1973 as a co-sponsor).
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scholars, advocates, and other experts.92 The idea was to help
implement a juvenile court “due process model governed by equity
and fairness,” as well as advance greater expertise and
accountability on the part of state juvenile courts. 93 The group
ultimately published a multi-volume set of materials for use by
state juvenile court stakeholders.94
Congress also passed the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act in 1974 (JJDPA).95 The law had many features,
including some important provisions relating to federal cases
involving youth, as will be discussed infra Section IV.96 However,
it largely focused on state juvenile courts who, under the act, were
required to undertake a range of reforms in order to receive federal
funding, including deinstitutionalizing status offenders—youth
who commit non-crimes, like truancy or curfew violations—and
removing most youth from adult facilities even when found guilty
of serious criminal acts.97 The Act also created the federal Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), which was
tasked with serving as an organizing hub to help states develop
and implement best juvenile justice practices and collect data on
state and local juvenile courts.98
92. See INST. FOR JUD. ADMIN. & A.B.A., STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE
ANNOTATED—A BALANCED APPROACH xvi–xviii (Robert E. Sheppard, Jr. ed., 2d ed.
1982), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/166773.pdf (last visited Sept. 25,
2020) (discussing the drafting process) [perma.cc/ZH5K-KBVD].
93. Id. at xviii.
94. See id. at xxv (describing the other resources that can be used by state
juvenile court stakeholders).
95. Juvenile and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-415, 88
Stat. 1109 (codified as amended at 34 U.S.C. § 11101).
96. See infra Section IV.
97. See Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN.
L. REV. 691, 697–98 (1991) (“The Federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act of 1974 required states to begin a process of removing noncriminal
offenders from secure detention and correctional facilities.”). Robert W. Sweet Jr.,
Deinstitutionalization of Status Offenders: In Perspective, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 389,
403 (1991) (providing analysis of treatment of status offenders in the 1960s and
1970’s); see also A.B.A., REPRESENTING JUVENILE STATUS OFFENDERS 67 (2010)
(outlining concerns regarding modern policing and prosecution practices
regarding status offenses).
98. See About OJJDP, OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION,
https://ojjdp.ojp.gov/about (last visited Aug 31, 2020) (explaining that the agency
was created “to support local and state efforts to prevent delinquency and improve
the juvenile justice system” and that it “accomplishes its mission by supporting
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Many states and territories further reviewed their laws and
implemented or amended their juvenile codes to comply with the
due process mandates of Kent, Gault, and Winship.99 These modern
juvenile code revisions generally included purposes provisions,
which focused on both child protection and constitutional rights.100
Some localities also began rethinking formal charges in low level
matters, creating pre-trial diversion programs to cover charges
beyond status offenses.101 However, to be sure, other state juvenile
courts were resistant to change or providing greater protections for
youth.102 And some jurisdictions used the due process movement to

states, local communities, and tribal jurisdictions in their efforts to develop and
implement effective programs for juveniles”) [perma.cc/TS69-BVFM]; see also
NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE: A DEVELOPMENTAL
APPROACH 282 (Richard Bonnie et al. eds., 2013) (noting that the creation of
OJJDP in 1974 “reflected a new federal commitment to help state and localities
strengthen their juvenile justice systems to make them more fair and effective”).
99. See NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, supra note 98, at 31 (recounting that during
this period law makers revisited juvenile law and practices in light of “principles
of justice and dealing fairly with young offenders”); see also Juvenile Code
Revisions Clear House Committee, QUAD CITY TIMES, Feb. 17, 1977, at 11
(reporting on progress of Iowa Juvenile Code rewrite); see also Juvenile Code
Views, SUBURBANITE ECONOMIST, May 17, 1973, at 4 (reporting on the state of
Illinois Juvenile Court Act, which went into effect in 1973 in order to bring greater
uniformity to juvenile court proceedings and “protect the rights of juveniles”); see
also Future of Juvenile Justice, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Nov. 5, 1972, at 34
(reporting on findings of Task Force calling for revisions to state’s Juvenile Code).
100. See RICHARD LAWRENCE & CRAIG HEMMINS, JUVENILE JUSTICE: A
TEXT/READER at 29–30 (Jerry Westby ed., 2008) (describing how in the late 1960’s
some jurisdictions began to revisit their purposes provisions in light of new
guidance suggesting new juvenile law focus on care and legal rights).
101. See S'Lee Arthur Hinshaw II, Juvenile Diversion: An Alternative to
Juvenile Court, 1993 J. DISP. RESOL. 305, 315 (1993) (“By the mid-1970s, hundreds
of diversion programs had appeared across the country.”); see also Malcolm W.
Klein, Deinstitutionalization and Diversion of Juvenile Offenders: A Litany of
Impediments, 1 CRIME & JUST.: ANN. REV. 145, 150 (1979) (defining diversion
programs).
Two projects report that only 42 and 43 percent of their referrals,
respectively, come from the justice system; another reports 67 and 57
percent of the referrals coming from the justice system in a program in
which the police officers themselves say that only a quarter of the cases
were diverted from formal processing. Such data leave little doubt of
the dimensions of the situation. Far too many referrals come from
sources—most often the schools—that are not justice related.
102. See Birckhead, supra note 71, at 39 (“The court was run informally and
few procedural protections were afforded to juveniles.”).
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justify harsher sanctions for youth or adopt laws that allowed more
youth to be transferred to adult courts.103
Indeed, throughout the 1980s and some of the 1990s, in
reaction to reportedly rising crime rates, many states adopted “get
tough” provisions relating to youthful repeat offenders and those
charged with serious crimes. 104 Under the banner of “adult crime,
adult time,” they moved away from the treatment that had
previously defined juvenile justice and toward heavier
consideration of the offense committed.105 New laws enumerated
offenses which automatically disqualified children from juvenile
court and instead relegated them to adult criminal courts.106
Additionally, judicial waiver statutes allowed judges to transfer
youth to the adult system.107 As borne out by data collected and

103. See id. at 43 (“[S]anctions became increasingly punitive for young
offenders . . . .”); see also PATRICK GRIFFIN, DIFFERENT FROM ADULTS: AN UPDATED
ANALYSIS OF JUVENILE TRANSFER AND BLENDED SENTENCING LAWS, WITH
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM 5 (National Center for Juvenile Justice 2008)
(describing how in the 1970s some states expanded juvenile transfer practices).
104. See Julianne Scheffer, Serious and Habitual Juvenile Offender Statutes:
Reconciling Punishment with Rehabilitation Within the Juvenile Justice System,
48 VAND. L. REV. 479, 509–10 (1995) (recounting shift in juvenile code provisions
exposing youth to imprisonment); see also Kelly Keimig Elsea, The Juvenile Crime
Debate: Rehabilitation, Punishment or Prevention, 5 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 135,
137–38 (1995) (noting enactment of new laws in late 1970’s, into the 1980’s,
allowing for more youth to be treated as adults for purposes of prosecution).
105. See Perry Moriearty & William Carson, Cognitive Warfare and Young
Black Males in America, 15 J. OF GENDER, RACE & JUST. 281, 281–82 (2012)
(“During the 1990s, nearly every state in the country enacted laws that made it
easier to try kids as adults, expanded criminal court sentencing authority over
juvenile offenders, and modified or eliminated juvenile court confidentiality
laws.”); see also Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75
MINN. L. REV. 691, 699–718 (1991) (summarizing the changes in juvenile court).
106. See Moriearty & Carson, supra note 105, at 300 (describing the “get
tough” laws which had the harshest impact on youth of color).
107. See id. at 298 (“Between 1992 and 1997 alone, legislatures in forty-five
states enacted or enhanced waiver laws that made it easier to transfer juvenile
offenders to the criminal justice system.”).
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maintained by OJJDP,108 all of these actions disproportionately
impacted Black and Brown youth.109
Heading into the twenty-first century, however, juvenile
courts and culture began to shift again in several important ways.
First, across the country many states and localities are seeking to
stem the tide of disproportionate minority contact (DMC) with the
juvenile justice system.110
This phenomenon
involves
over-representation of youth of color at time of arrest, in juvenile
delinquency proceedings, secure detention centers, and placed
long-term outside of their homes. 111 Although the problem
persists,112 many jurisdictions have embraced a range of
DMC-reduction strategies.113 This has been in part driven by
108. Indeed, as the JDPA was amended over time and will be further
described below, OJJDP became tasked with monitoring disproportionate
minority contact and confinement. See, e.g., OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQ.
PREVENTION, EVALUATION OF THE DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONFINEMENT
INITIATIVE: FLORIDA FINAL REPORT v (1996), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/dmcfl.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2020) (noting for Florida that “major findings were
that African-American youth were overrepresented at every stage of the juvenile
justice process”) [perma.cc/6FE9-MFES].
109. See Moriearty & Carson, supra note 105, at 300 (“These so-called ‘get
tough’ laws of the 1990s had by far the harshest impact on youth of color . . . [and]
disparities soared during the 1980s and 1990s.”); see also Kristin Henning,
Criminalizing Ordinary Adolescent Behaviors in Communities of Color: The Role
of Prosecutors in Juvenile Justice Reform, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 383, 425 (2013)
(“[W]hile there are no national data on the number of youth transferred to adult
court on the basis of prosecutorial waivers, evidence demonstrates that youth of
color are disproportionately represented in the criminal justice system.”).
110. See
JOSH
ROVNER,
SENTENCING
PROJECT
POLICY
BRIEF:
DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONTACT IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (2014),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/disproportionate-minoritycontact-in-the-juvenile-justice-system/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2020) (describing
emergence of DMC reduction movement in 1980s) [perma.cc/TS9B-XDXE].
111. See What is R.E.D?, W. HAYWOOD BURNS INST. FOR JUST., FAIRNESS, &
EQUITY, https://www.burnsinstitute.org/what-is-red/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2020)
(describing phenomenon of racial and ethnic disparity in thirty one of sixty three
state juvenile justice systems evaluated) [perma.cc/Z7GC-5ZEM].
112. See Kim Taylor-Thompson, Girl Talk—Examining Racial and Gender
Lines in Juvenile Justice, 6 NEV. L.J. 1137, 1140 (2005–06) (describing
criminalization of girls of color for many ordinary adolescent behaviors).
113. See, e.g., MINNESOTA MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, RESULTS FIRST:
JUVENILE JUSTICE BENEFIT COST ANALYSIS 16–19 (2018), https://mn.gov/mmbstat/results-first/juvenile-justice-report.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2020) (outlining
concerns about ongoing racial disparities across domains in the Minnesota
juvenile justice system and efforts to address overrepresentation)
[perma.cc/83KC-AN7T].
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mandates pursuant to the amended JJDPA.114 They required the
creation of juvenile justice State Advisory Groups (SAGs), data
collection, and affirmative steps to reduce disparities in order to
maintain federal funding for juvenile courts.115 Working with
groups like the Annie E. Casey Foundation and W. Haywood Burns
Institute, many local systems have created structures to help
divert youth from formal court proceedings and dispositions that
remove them from their families and communities.116 For instance,
starting in 1992, the Casey Foundation funded efforts within
individual local juvenile courts to track, monitor, and seek to
reduce racial disparities in pre-trial detention determinations.117
The project, known as the Juvenile Detention Alternatives
Initiative (JDAI), was launched with five different demonstration
sites and its lessons have since been deployed across the country
to help lower the number of unnecessary pre-trial juvenile court
detentions118—with an emphasis on racial justice and reducing
racial bias in state juvenile justice proceedings.119 More recently,

114. See ROVNER, supra note 110, at 8 (“To be eligible for funding under the
JJDPA, the law requires states to ‘address’ DMC . . . .”).
115. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EVALUATION OF THE DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY
CONFINEMENT INITIATIVE:
FLORIDA FINAL REPORT at v (1996) (“The
disproportionate minority confinement (DMC) mandate of the Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention Act requires States to develop and implement
strategies to address and reduce the overrepresentation of minority youth in
secure facilities.”); see also COAL. FOR JUV. JUST., BUILDING STATE ADVISORY GROUP
CAPACITY: A TOOLKIT FOR EFFECTIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE LEADERSHIP (2014)
(offering guidance to local stakeholders seeking to improve local juvenile justice
systems by way of a written “toolkit” funded by OJJDP).
116. See What is R.E.D?, supra note 111 (offering trainings for state juvenile
justice staff and other stakeholders ); see generally, Strategies, ANNIE E. CASEY
FOUND., https://www.aecf.org/work/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2020) (providing
description of various juvenile justice projects intended to reduce the use of secure
detention and incarceration) [perma.cc/EGU4-P6XT].
117. ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., REDUCING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN JUVENILE
DETENTION 4 (Eleanor Hinton Hoytt et. al., eds. 2003).
118. Id. at 5–9; see also, e.g., RICHARD MENDEL, BEYOND DETENTION: SYSTEM
TRANSFORMATION THROUGH JUVENILE DETENTION REFORM 10 (2007) (describing
the JDAI project’s growth from its initial demonstration locations to “being
implemented in approximately 80 jurisdictions in 20 states and the District of
Columbia”).
119. See MENDEL, supra note 118, at 63 (reporting that “all [JDAI] sites strive
to identify and remove biases (both structural and human) that produce racial
disparities in detention”).
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concerns about bias have expanded beyond race to ethnicity under
the title of Reducing Ethnic Disparities (RED).120
Second, youth advocates and juvenile justice stakeholders
have become more attuned to social science findings relating to
behavioral psychology and adolescent brain development
literature.121 Drawing on the teachings of U.S. Supreme Court
cases including Roper v. Simmons,122 Graham v. Florida,123 and
Miller v. Alabama,124 juvenile counsel and courts alike have shifted
their thinking from seeing youth as simply miniature adults to
recognizing
their
distinctly
different
risk-taking
and
decision-making processes.125 Relatedly, many are now much more
mindful of the psychological and physical trauma endured by most
youth charged with crimes.126 Those working with such young
people, in many instances, seek to employ trauma-informed
practices
including
positive
behavioral
supports
and
strength-based engagements to identify youth strengths,
120. See Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-386, 88 Stat.
1109 (codified as amended at 34 U.S.C. § 11101) (reauthorizing and amending the
JJDPA of 1974 to include, among other things, provisions relating to RED); see
also What is R.E.D?, supra note 111 (explaining range of problem practices that
result in RED).
121. See Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Brain Science and Juvenile Justice
Policymaking, 23 PSYCH., PUB. POL’Y & L. 410, 411 (2017) (outlining ways that
psychology and neurobiology have informed both U.S. Supreme Court
jurisprudence relating to youth and policy decisions around the country); see also
Richard Bonnie & Elizabeth Scott, The Teenage Brain: Adolescent Brain Research
and the Law, 22 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCH. SCIENCE 158, 160 (2013) (“In
combination, behavioral and neurobiological research on adolescence have played
an important role in advancing policies that recognize the immaturity of young
offenders in responding to juvenile crime.”).
122. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding the imposition of
the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of eighteen when their
crimes were committed to be unconstitutional).
123. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (holding juvenile offenders
may not be sentenced to life without parole for non-homicidal crimes).
124. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012) (holding juvenile offenders
may not be sentenced to life without parole for homicide offenses).
125. See Cara Drinan, The Miller Revolution, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1787, 1789
(2016) (“Many have called for a re-examination of juvenile justice practices across
the board in the wake of Miller.”).
126. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Children Are Different: Constitutional Values and
Justice Policy, 11 OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. L. 71, 103 (2013) (attributing the Supreme
Court’s modern line of juvenile justice cases to an increasing understanding of the
role that developmental science play in adolescent offending).
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acknowledge successes, and more collaboratively engage with
young people and their families.127
For example, the National Center for Mental Health and
Juvenile Justice has released a resource guide to assist juvenile
court lawyers, probation officers, and judges to prevent them from
retraumatizing the youth and families who find themselves within
such systems.128 And the National Council of Juvenile and Family
Court Judges has not only declared that all juvenile courts should
be “trauma-informed” in their practices, but provides professional
peer assessments of state court judges to provide feedback on
performance and encourage more youth and family centered
approaches.129
Finally, there is greater appreciation for the special role of
juvenile defenders and child-centered prosecutors. Decades after
the Gault decision, questions and concerns remained about the
right to and role of counsel for kids charged with wrongdoing.130
127. See, e.g., NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY
REPORT (2019) (sharing data and resources for juvenile justice stakeholders, to
assist in their understanding of juvenile traumatic brain injury); see also Precious
Skinner-Osei, Laura Mangan, Mara Liggett, Michelle Kerrigan, & Jill S.
Levenson, Justice-Involved Youth and Trauma-Informed Interventions, 16 JUST.
POL’Y J. 1, 1 (2019) (“Juvenile justice service systems should work to implement
trauma-informed interventions that address the needs of youth with mental
health and trauma related disorders.”).
128. See NAT’L CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH & JUV. JUST., TRAUMA AMONG YOUTH
IN
THE
JUVENILE
JUSTICE
SYSTEM
12
(2016),
http://jjie.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/02/Trauma-Among-Youth-in-the-Juvenile-Justice-Systemfor-WEBSITE.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2020) (analyzing the benefits and
challenges of a trauma-informed juvenile justice system while providing guidance
from the field) [perma.cc/G8CG-XDJM].
129. See NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUV. & FAM. CT. JUDGES, Trauma-Informed Courts,
https://www.ncjfcj.org/child-welfare-and-juvenile-law/trauma-informed-courts/
(last visited Aug. 29, 2020) (“All judges should appropriately engage families,
professionals, organizations, and communities to support effectively child safety,
permanency, well-being, victim safety, offender accountability, healthy family
functioning, and community protection.”) [perma.cc/D2GY-JSKT].
130. See A.B.A. JUV. CTR., JUV. L. CTR. & YOUTH L. CTR., A CALL FOR JUSTICE:
AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN
DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 15–17 (Patricia Puritz et al. eds., 1995) (studying
right to and role of juvenile defenders in localities across the country through
funding from the federal Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention);
see also Barbara Fedders, Losing Hold of the Guiding Hand: Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel in Juvenile Delinquency Matters, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
771, 787 (2010) (noting the persistence of paternalism over zeal that permeated
youth representation post-Gault).
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Only a few jurisdictions, like the District of Columbia, maintained
specialized juvenile defender units in the 1980s focused on the
provision of quality representation for kids in conflict with the
law.131 Thus, in the early 1990s the American Bar Association
(ABA) along with the Juvenile Law Center and Youth Law Center
undertook a national study to shed light on the problem of
sub-standard juvenile defense practices in juvenile courts.132
Shortly thereafter, the National Juvenile Defender Center
(NJDC) was established to lift up the importance of juvenile
defense representation and offer yearly trainings to advance
zealous, youth-centered advocacy in the nation’s juvenile courts.133
Today, many localities across the country have individual
attorneys or entire specialized juvenile defense units providing
holistic representation for youth on the state level.134 Such
child-centered advocacy may include intervention from time of first
police contact to adjudication, to appeals, post-disposition, and
re-entry.135
131. See PATRICIA PURITZ & WENDY WAN LONG SHANG, OFF. OF JUV. JUST. &
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, NCJ NO. 171151, INNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO
JUVENILE INDIGENT DEFENSE, at 5 (1998) (describing early commitment of the
Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia (PDS) to quality youth
representation, including the launch of its Juvenile Services Program in the
1980’s).
132. See CALL FOR JUSTICE, supra note 130, at 41–42 (reporting on
substandard representation practices observed in the 1990’s in juvenile court
matters); see also N. Lee Cooper, Patricia Puritz, & Wendy Wan Long Shang,
Fulfilling the Promise of In Re Gault: Advancing the Role of Lawyers for Children,
33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 651, 667–79 (1998) (cataloging efforts to raise the bar for
lawyers representing children accused of crimes).
133. See About NJDC, NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR., https://njdc.info/about-njdc/ (last
visited Aug. 30, 2020) (explaining that NJDC was “created in the late ’90s to
respond to the critical need to build the capacity of the juvenile defense bar and
to improve access to counsel and quality of representation for children in the
justice system”) [perma.cc/36E2-9RCF].
134. See NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR., DEFEND CHILDREN: A BLUEPRINT FOR
EFFECTIVE JUVENILE DEFENDER SERVICES 25 (2016) (acknowledging recent
development of the Youth Advocacy Division of the Massachusetts Committee for
Public Counsel Services, Miami-Dade Public Defender’s Office Juvenile Defense
Unit, and San Francisco Public Defender Juvenile Unit); see also NAT’L JUV. DEF.
CTR., PROTECTING RIGHTS, PROMOTING POSITIVE OUTCOMES: POST-DISPOSITIONAL
ACCESS TO COUNSEL 2–4 (2014) (listing various organizations, including the
Juvenile Protection Division of the Maryland Public Defender’s Office, and New
York City’s Legal Aid Society, as offering holistic defense representation).
135. See NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR., INNOVATION BRIEF: EARLY APPOINTMENT OF
COUNSEL 2 (2013) (reporting on involvement of youth counsel in delinquency
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Similar youth-centered moves can be seen in many
prosecutors’ offices around the country, where district attorneys
are stepping beyond their traditional roles. 136 Work by
clinician-scholars like Kristin Henning have helped shed light on
the ways in which local juvenile court prosecutors have been
criminalizing normal adolescent behaviors, particularly in
communities of color.137 And policy statements and best practices
guides by the National District Attorney’s Association have called
upon juvenile prosecutors to expand their portfolios to do more
than merely react to youth wrongdoing with prosecution.138
Rather, they are encouraged to embrace their roles as community
change agents to support young people through diversion and
other non-punitive programming attuned to youth needs and
capacities.139
IV. Submerged “Federal Juvenile Court” Story
As the country’s juvenile justice story has unfolded in the
decades following Allen, developments within the U.S. District
courts have been largely overlooked. And yet, even after the rise of
the juvenile court movement, youth have been prosecuted in our
federal system.140 This has occurred not just in matters where it
matters even before first appearance, such as in New Jersey juvenile courts); see
also NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR., APPEALS: A CRITICAL CHECK ON THE JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY SYSTEM 1–2 (2014) (describing work of groups like the Juvenile
Division of the Office of the Ohio Public Defender, which handles direct appeals
and re-entry work for juvenile court-involved youth).
136. See Kristin N. Henning, Criminalizing Normal Adolescent Behavior in
Communities of Color: The Role of Prosecutors in Juvenile Justice Reform, 98
CORNELL L. REV. 383, 458 (2013) (discussing the New Orleans District Attorney
Office’s work with the American Bar Association to expand and improve its
diversion program).
137. See generally id.
138. See
Juvenile
Justice,
NAT’L
DIST.
ATT’YS’
ASS’N,
https://ndaa.org/programs/juvenile-justice/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2020)
(“Prosecutors no longer merely react to juvenile crime . . . [the] NDAA updated
the National Juvenile Prosecution Standards and the Juvenile Prosecution Policy
Positions and Guidelines in consideration of th[is] balanced approach.”)
[perma.cc/RU7D-92NU].
139. See id. (noting that now prosecutors “initiate strategies to prevent
[crime]”).
140. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
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was determined adult prosecution for federal charges would be
appropriate, as was described in the earlier essay in this series.141
Instead, for years, Article III courts have been overseeing what
might be considered the equivalent of state juvenile court
delinquency proceedings—somewhat invisible federal juvenile
courts.142
A. Early Federal Juvenile Case Processes and Examples
As noted, since the formal establishment of our federal court
system in 1789,143 youth were seen as proper subjects for federal
prosecution.144 Different from what happened in state court
systems at the turn of the last century, however, youth
prosecutions in U.S. District Courts continued to be addressed in
light of the common law for nearly fifty years more.145 As explained
by one federal district court, “Prior to the adoption of the Federal
Juvenile Delinquency Act of 1938, the Federal criminal law was
lacking in any comprehensive provisions on the subject of juvenile
delinquency. The juvenile offender against the laws of the United
States was treated and prosecuted in the same manner as an
adult.”146
1 (2017) (“[Y]outhful offenders account for about 18 percent of all federal offenders
sentenced between fiscal years 2010 and 2015 . . . .”).
141. See Quinn & McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 537–38 (“Indeed, while it is
not common knowledge, our federal district courts process a sizable number of
young people each year.”).
142. See id. (describing the federal juvenile criminal process as largely
invisible).
143. See Judith Resnik & Kevin Walsh, Article III, Section 2 By Judith Resnik
and
Kevin
C.
Walsh,
NAT’L
CONST.
CTR.,
https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/interpretation/articleiii/section/203 (last visited Aug. 30, 2020) (highlighting the Congress’s role in
establishing the federal judicial system in 1789) [perma.cc/2P3Q-DAAJ].
144. See Quinn & McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 539 (“[Y]outh have faced
prosecution, transfer, and adult sentencing in our federal court system since our
nation’s founding.”).
145. See id. at 539–40 (describing approaches to federal youth prosecution
prior to passage of the 1938 Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act); see also BARRY
FELD & DONNA BISHOP, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE CRIME AND JUVENILE
JUSTICE 428 (2011) (“The juvenile court movement, however, remained a state
phenomenon in the early twentieth century.”).
146. United States v. Borders, 154 F. Supp. 214, 215 (N.D. Ala. 1957).
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The Federal Children’s Bureau monitored and collected data
relating to juvenile justice issues, including cases prosecuted in
federal court in the early 1900’s.147 As a result, some see it as a
precursor to OJJDP.148 Reports from Bureau investigator Ruth
Bloodgood show that most early twentieth century federal juvenile
cases involved children who had stolen mail (postal offenses), items
from trains (interstate commerce offenses) or cars (Dyer Act
violations).149 At the time, data for juvenile cases was
inconsistently reported.150 A few years later, information contained
in a report by the Wickersham Commission would reveal that
Bloodgood’s report had missed alleged immigration offenses
entirely, which comprised a substantial portion of juvenile cases.151
147. The Federal Children’s Bureau, an arm of the U.S. Labor Department,
was conceptualized during President Theodore Roosevelt’s administration as part
of the movement to redeem and reform the nation’s wayward youth. See Quinn,
supra note 66, at 58 (explaining the impetus for the creation of the Children’s
Bureau). But at least some of Roosevelt’s “child saving” rhetoric suggested
concern for white children as a means of protecting the purity of the white race
and family. Id. (citing KRISTE LINDENMEYER, “A RIGHT TO CHILDHOOD”: THE U.S.
CHILDREN’S BUREAU AND CHILD WELFARE, 1912–46 at 16, 145 (1997)). Not all
Children’s Bureau staff—almost all women—shared such fears or
understandings of a “normal life”. See id.; see also Mae C. Quinn, In Loco Juvenile
Justice: Minors in Munis, Cash from Kids, and Pro Se Adolescent Advocacy, 2015
BYU L. REV. 1247, 1254–55 (2015) (describing the efforts by Emma Lundberg of
the Federal Children’s Bureau to hold juvenile courts to a high standard). Author
Mae Quinn is writing about the household relationship between Lundberg and
the Bureau’s Director, Katharine Lenroot as part of her continuing Feminist
Legal Realism project.
148. See Bonnie, supra note 98, at 282 n.1 (noting the parallel between the
Children’s Bureau of 1912 and today’s OJJDP).
149. See generally RUTH BLOODGOOD, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE DELINQUENT
CHILD: A STUDY OF THE METHODS OF DEALING WITH CHILDREN WHO HAVE VIOLATED
FEDERAL LAWS (1922) (detailing throughout her entire piece the different charges
juveniles frequently faced in the early 1900s).
150. See NAT’L COMM’N ON L. OBSERVANCE & ENF’T, REPORT ON THE CHILD
OFFENDER IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM OF JUSTICE 34 (1931) [hereinafter NAT’L
COMM’N ON L. OBSERVANCE] (“These conditions explain the face that save in a few
places and under special conditions, there was no cordial, effective cooperation
between these branches of the federal service.”).
151. BLOODGOOD, supra note 149. Note that reporting practices almost
certainly distorted these facts to some extent. Bloodgood acknowledges that each
and every postal offense was reported by post offices, but courts did not
consistently report every other juvenile offense. Her data showed many more
postal offenses than other federal law violations. While mail crimes certainly put
many children in federal crosshairs, its prevalence was likely overstated in her
report. In 1931, the Wickersham Commission reported that postal offenses
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After the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment, prohibition
offenses constituted the bulk of juvenile charges in federal
courts.152 The Wickersham Commission, which tracked federal
juvenile prosecutions from June to December of 1930, found that
prohibition offenses comprised 44% of those prosecutions and
immigration offenses comprised 21%, a ratio of about two-to-one.153
Strikingly, more than half of juvenile prohibition offenders were
released with no disposition, while 80% of juvenile immigration
offenders were sentenced to imprisonment.154
The basic procedure for bringing a juvenile case before a
federal court was identical to that of adults.155 It began with a
presentation of facts to the U.S. attorney followed by a preliminary
hearing in front of a U.S. commissioner where bond was set. 156 The
case was then presented to the grand jury for indictment, or via
information in the case of misdemeanors.157 The child’s case would
be open to the public and typically by jury.158
Some federal district courts appeared reluctant to handle
children the same as adults, as evidenced by the fact that some
comprised only 5% of federal law violations by children, surpassed by prohibition
(44.2%), immigration (21.9%), and motor vehicle theft (a.k.a. Dyer Act violations,
17.5%). NAT’L COMM’N ON L. OBSERVANCE, supra note 150, at 34. See also DEP’T OF
JUST., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 67
(1910) (reporting on the business of the Department of Justice during the 1910
fiscal year).
152. See Fred R. Johnson, Commentary, Report on the Child Offender in the
Federal System of Justice, 30 MICHIGAN L. REV. 110, 110 (1931) (summarizing the
findings of the report).
153. NAT’L COMM’N ON L. OBSERVANCE, supra note 150, at 34.
154. See id. at 36–37 (explaining the attitudes held by the public regarding
the National Prohibition Act). It should be noted that over half of juvenile
immigration arrests were made in two relatively new federal districts in Texas.
Bloodgood points out that federal judges were hesitant to send children far from
their families, so there may have been a vast distance between those district
courts and suitable juvenile institutions, resulting in increased incarceration in
adult facilities.
155. As noted by Children’s Bureau Director Grace Abbott, “little children are
still proceeded against in U.S. courts by the ordinary method of arrest, detention
in jail with adults pending arraignment for bail, indictment by the grand jury,
and final discharge or sentence of fine or imprisonment.” See Feld and Bishop,
supra note 145, at 428 (quoting Abbott’s letter, transmitting Bloodgood’s report
to the Secretary of Labor).
156. BLOODGOOD, supra note 149, at 4.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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developed their own, sometimes informal, ways to defer children to
state courts.159 By 1922, five of the eighty or so districts were
routinely referring juvenile cases to state courts for processing,
and two had developed agreements with juvenile courts to take all
cases where a child violated federal law.160 Alternatively, many
federal courts deferred children to state juvenile courts by
dropping federal charges.161
As explained by Bloodgood:
For instance, in many cases of larceny of mail[,] the charge
preferred [was] simply that of larceny or ‘taking the property of
another.’ In some cases[,] the offense may involve both a State
and a Federal charge, as in larceny from a post office located in
a general store, merchandise also being stolen. In such cases[,]
the State charge is often preferred and the Federal charge
dropped, the Federal authorities considering the State
prosecution sufficient.162

Otherwise, children in federal courts often mingled with
adults in long pre-trial detention periods since district courts
essentially traveled to different places around the district and
children either had to wait for court to be held in their area or, if
they did not live near a meeting place, find a way to travel to one.163
If a child was found guilty in federal court, some judges adopted
the practice of sentencing children to sit in the U.S. Marshal’s
159. Id. at 8.
In one district the post-office inspector handled informally postal cases
involving children, reporting each case, with his decision, to the district
attorney, who usually concurred in the recommendation of the
inspector and did not see the child . . . . In some cases reaching the
grand jury, because of the youth of the offender, a finding of ‘no bill’
was returned. This amounts to a dismissal of the case, since no further
court action is taken. In many cases the attorney did not wish to
prosecute, even though a bill of indictment was returned, and he
entered a petition to nolle prosequi—also a form of dismissal without
trial.
160. See BLOODGOOD, supra note 149, at 6 (describing the informal practices
by district courts and prosecutors); see also R. WHEELER & C. HARRISON, CREATING
THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 23–25 (3d. ed. 1989) (tracking the development of
the Federal court system and the number of district courts over time).
161. BLOODGOOD, supra note 149, at 3.
162. Id.
163. See id. at 4 (describing the hardship of attending hearings at a district
court).
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office for the rest of the day.164 Others gave rather short sentences
in the local jail, or, as was the preference in at least one city, the
smaller county jail located outside the city.165
Federal court rules did not provide children with social
investigations, pre-trial detention separate from adults, or, for a
long time, probation.166 Although probation was not provided for
by statute, federal judges routinely placed children on probation
until 1916 when the Supreme Court declared that district courts
did not possess that power.167 In contrast, every state had already
provided for probation for youth.168
By 1932, a decade after Bloodgood reported on children in
federal courts, the Wickersham Commission noted that children
continued to be treated like adults while states had already largely
shifted away from such a model.169 And at least one commentator
declared the Commission’s report “shows conclusively that the
government has hitherto failed to keep abreast of the times in
dealing with the child delinquent.”170 The report recommended
that measures be taken to move children out of federal courts
entirely and into state juvenile courts.171

164. Id. at 8.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 4–5 (describing which court services and dispositions were
unavailable to juvenile defendants).
167. See Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 28 (1916) (“[T]he courts . . . have
no inherent constitutional power to mitigate or avert [Congressionally imposed]
penalties by refusing to indict them in individual cases.”); see also BLOODGOOD,
supra note 149, at 45–63 (illustrating the widespread use of probation by
comparing the sentences imposed on juvenile offenders across eight different
jurisdictions).
168. BLOODGOOD, supra note 149, at 5.
169. Johnson, supra note 152, at 110.
170. Id. at 111; see also J. M. McCallie, Review of Report on the Child Offender
in the Federal System of Justice by National Commission on Law Observance and
Enforcement, 22 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 930–31 (1932).
[W]hereas the Federal law, as it relates to juvenile offenders has been
static, laws enacted by the several states, relative to the same class of
offenders, have changed from year to year to meet the new
conception—that the child offender has rights peculiar to children, and
that it is the duty of the State for its own good and for the good of the
child to do everything possible to salvage him.
171. J. M. McCallie, supra note 170, at 931.
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B. Current Statutory and Procedural Scheme

In 1938, Congress finally passed the Federal Juvenile
Delinquency Act (FJDA),172 reportedly “with the realization that
persons under the age of eighteen do not have mature judgment
and may not fully realize the nature or consequences of their
acts.”173 With the Act, the federal system officially acknowledged
state juvenile court as an appropriate alternative venue for dealing
with youthful violations of law.174
However, unlike the laws and procedures relating to the
Chicago Juvenile Court, the FJDA in its original form did not
contemplate special child-focused probation staff assigned to cases,
special court rooms, or overall reorientation towards treatment
and rehabilitation.175 In addition, under the original act, the
federal prosecutor retained exclusive power to determine whether
a child would be offered juvenile rather than adult processes in
federal court.176
Thus as enacted, the FJDA provided that when a child was
charged with offenses against the United States, “he shall be
prosecuted as a juvenile delinquent if the Attorney General in his
discretion so directs and the accused consents to such
procedure.”177 Meaning, if the prosecutor felt the child warranted
exclusion from adult process, and the defense agreed,178 then the
172. Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, ch. 486, 52 Stat. 764 (1938) (current
version at 18 U.S.C. § 5031–5043); see also Sessions & Bracey, supra note 16, at
509–10 (examining the act’s history).
173. United States v. Webb, 112 F. Supp. 950, 951 (W.D. Okla. 1953).
174. See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL30822, JUVENILE
DELINQUENTS AND FEDERAL JUVENILE LAW: THE FEDERAL JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
ACT AND RELATED MATTERS 2 (2004) (“Congress . . . authoriz[ed] the Department
of Justice to return juveniles charged with violating federal law to the juvenile
authorities of their home state.”).
175. Compare Illinois Juvenile Court Act, 1899 Ill. Laws 133 (governing the
Chicago Juvenile Court system) and CHI. BAR ASS’N, REPORTS OF OFFICERS AND
COMMITTEES OF THE CHICAGO BAR ASSOCIATION 61 (1899) (“[The Illinois Juvenile
Court Act’s] fundamental idea is that the State must step in and exercise
guardianship under such adverse social or individual conditions as develop
crime.”), with Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act of 1938.
176. Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, ch. 486, 52 Stat. 764 (1938) (current
version at 18 U.S.C. § 5031–5043).
177. Id.
178. Commentators have questioned whether a youth in federal court would
ever prefer prosecution as an adult rather than special juvenile delinquency
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youth would “be prosecuted by information on the charge of
juvenile delinquency” meaning that “no prosecution [would] be
instituted for the specific offense alleged to have been committed
by him.”179
From the perspective of at least one prominent federal
prosecutor at the time, such an arrangement was “progressive” and
a “far-reaching advance” for youth under the age of eighteen.180
This was in part, he argued, because such cases contemplated
“informal procedures” such as prosecution of youth without
indictment by the grand jury.181 Indeed, over time it became
commonly understood that the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure did not strictly apply to such cases and that judges were
free to hold “hearings in chambers” for federal juvenile delinquency
matters.182
In 1948, the Act was amended to provide district court judges
with the authority to determine whether a youth could receive
federal juvenile delinquency treatment versus adult criminal
processes.183 But heading into the second half of the twentieth
century, juvenile delinquency proceedings in federal court
remained confused and conflicted in their elements and goals.184
processes. See Brandon Miller, 7 Top Pros and Cons of Juveniles Being Tried As
Adults, GREEN GARAGE, (Aug. 25, 2015), https://greengarageblog.org/7-top-prosand-cons-of-juveniles-being-tried-as-adults (last visited Aug. 31, 2020) (noting a
benefit of being tried as an adult is the constitutional guarantee to a jury trial)
[perma.cc/Q47Q-PH3V]. But see Quinn & McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 560
(discussing “fast track” immigration cases).
179. Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, ch. 486, 52 Stat. 764 (1938) (current
version at 18 U.S.C. § 5031–5043); see also Barnes v. Prescor, 68 F. Supp. 127
(W.D. Mo. 1946) (quoting FJDA in effect in 1940’s and acknowledging its
deference to prosecutorial determination around juvenile treatment).
180. See Alexander Holtzhoff, Some Problems of Federal Criminal Procedure,
2 F.R.D. 431, 436–37 (1942) (describing the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act as
a “a vital and far-reaching advance in the treatment of juvenile delinquents in the
Federal courts”).
181. Id.
182. Proceedings of the Institute of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 5
F.R.D. 88, 96 (1945).
183. See Webb, 112 F. Supp. at 951–52 (describing FJDA’s amendment,
recodification at 18 U.S.C. 5032, and transfer hearing process); see also United
States v. Jones, 141 F. Supp. 641 (E.D. Va. 1956) (noting that in 1948 the law
changed to require court determination of the question of juvenile process or adult
prosecution in federal court).
184. See United States v. Smith, 675 F. Supp. 307, 311 (E.D.N.C. 1987)
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For instance, courts talked a great deal about wanting to protect
youth from the stigma of having an adult federal conviction on
their criminal record.185 However, the delinquency process was
limited to cases where life sentences or the death penalty were not
possible.186 And to advance the FJDA’s ends, not only did district
court judges take children into chambers to remove them from
public onlookers in federal courtrooms—but sometimes to directly
advise them, encourage them to waive formal jury trial rights for
their own good, and potentially resolve juvenile cases in a speedy
manner—often without provision of counsel.187
Even when such matters proceeded to trial on delinquency
rather than adult charges, youth were housed with adult
defendants while awaiting resolution of their cases.188 Trials were
not seen as a forum for finding youth guilty of a specific crime, but
merely intended as an “adjudication of a status.”189 And whatever
it meant to prove such a status, prosecutors were only required to
meet the burden with a preponderance of the evidence and not
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.190
(commenting on the lack of substantive changes made by the 1948 amendments).
185. See Jones, 141 F. Supp. at 644 (declaring that it was in the “best interest”
of youth to accept recommendations of a commissioner who recommends
proceeding under federal juvenile delinquency procedures).
186. See Webb, 112 F. Supp. at 951–52 (quoting prior version of 18 U.S.C. §
5032); see also Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, Pub. L. No. 75-666, 52 Stat.
764, 765 (1938) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2018)) (limiting Act’s
application to “[a] juvenile alleged to have committed one or more acts in violation
of a law of the United States not punishable by death or life imprisonment, and
not surrendered to the authorities of a state”).
187. See Pamplin v. United States, 221 F.2d 557, 557–58 (10th Cir. 1955)
(upholding sentence in juvenile delinquency matter after federal judge advised
youth off the record in chambers and allowed youth to waive right to trial without
any provision of counsel); see also Jones, 141 F. Supp. at 644 (agreeing with
federal practice of judicial engagement with youth in juvenile delinquency matter
without involvement of counsel).
188. See Barkman v. Sanford, 162 F.2d 592, 594 (5th Cir. 1947) (explaining
that youth who availed themselves of federal delinquency processes would speed
up case resolution by waiving grand jury proceeding and “spared weeks and
months” of being in close quarters with adult offenders).
189. See, e.g., United States v. Hoston, 353 F.2d 723, 724 (7th Cir. 1965)
(referring to Congressional record for the FJDA and stating “such proceeding
results in the adjudication of a status rather than a conviction of a crime”).
190. See United States v. Borders, 154 F. Supp. 214, 216 (N.D. Ala. 1957) (“To
sustain an adjudication of delinquency, most of the authorities require the same
amount and kind of proof as would be required in an ordinary civil action.”).
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Additionally, since mens rea as a concept seemed to be more
lax in federal delinquency proceedings, the common law infancy
defense was also jettisoned.191 Thus, in the case of twelve-year-old
Jural Borders, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that his
incapacity due to his youth was irrelevant to a federal delinquency
determination.192 Thus, his act of flipping a brake switch at a
railyard under federal jurisdiction, resulting in extensive damage
to several train cars that then derailed, reportedly justified his
commitment under the FJDA.193 For Borders, that meant being
sent to a reform school until age twenty one.194
Indeed in the 1960s if deemed a federal delinquent, children
were either placed on probation by the district court or ordered into
the custody of the Attorney General, who might commit the child
to any number of settings for “adjustment.”195 A commitment
under the act could last until the child turned twenty-one or the
maximum period of incarceration permitted for the underlying
offense, whichever was shorter.196 And the Attorney General
apparently was permitted to employ any number of settings for
FJDA commitments—from youth reformatories to adult prisons

191. See Fagerstrom v. United States, 311 F.2d 717, 720–21 (8th Cir. 1963)
(suggesting, while not deciding, that incompetence to stand trial based upon
mental incapacity might present a viable challenge in federal juvenile
delinquency proceedings even if infancy did not).
192. See Borders v. United States, 256 F.2d 458, 459 (5th Cir. 1958) (“A
proceeding against a juvenile under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act is not
a criminal proceeding in which the government must show criminal
capacity . . . .”).
193. See id. (affirming the district judge’s commitment of child under the
FJDA).
194. See id. (upholding District Court’s determination that youthful
incapacity was irrelevant and affirming order to commit youth to “reform school
until he was twenty-one years of age”).
195. See, e.g., Sonnenberg v. Markley, 289 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1961)
(noting the statutory option of either putting juveniles on probation or committing
them to the Attorney General’s custody for the purpose of “custody, care,
subsistence, education, and training”).
196. See id. (quoting the applicable law, which gave the court the discretion
to commit a juvenile delinquent “for a period not exceeding his minority” and
added that “[s]uch commitment shall not exceed the term which might have been
imposed had he been tried and convicted of the alleged violation”).
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many miles away.197 Some such facilities were run by states or
private entities; some were federal facilities.198
For instance, Douglas Eugene Kemp of Arkansas, who as a
child allegedly forged his name to a $157.20 U.S. Treasury Check
to use in a grocery store, was moved around to several facilities
during his three-year FJDA placement across multiple states.199
This included one stint at a federal reformatory in El Reno,
Oklahoma and another at the Federal Correctional Institution of
Texarkana, Texas after his original case disposition in the Western
District of Arkansas.200 The youth’s pro se habeas corpus
application complaining about his placement with and treatment
by officials in Texas was dismissed as being without merit.201
In the early 1960s William Virgil Fagerstrom, a Native
American youth with an eighth-grade education, was similarly
shuttled to different jurisdictions across the country based upon a
federal juvenile delinquency finding that he was in possession of a
stolen car on the Red Lake Reservation in Minnesota.202 Because
no state juvenile court had jurisdiction over the case, Fagerstrom
was initially placed in the Federal Correctional Institution in
Englewood, Colorado.203 From there he was sent to Springfield,
Missouri—where the federal Bureau of Prisons maintained a
medical facility for mental health care.204 As will be further
197. See Suarez v. Wilkinson, 133 F. Supp. 38, 40 (M.D. Pa. 1955) (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 5034 as providing that the “Attorney General may designate any public
or private agency or foster home for the custody, care, subsistence, education, and
training of the juvenile during the period for which he was committed”).
198. See, e.g., id. at 38–39 (explaining that petitioner was committed
originally to the Federal Correction Institution in Englewood, Colorado, and then
transferred to the United States Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania).
199. See United States v. Kemp, 204 F. Supp. 941, 942 (W.D. Ark. 1962)
(noting Kemp’s transfer from a federal facility in Oklahoma to one in Texas).
200. See id. (“[H]e was delivered to the Federal Reformatory at El Reno,
Oklahoma. Later he was transferred from the Reformatory to the Federal
Correctional Institution at Texarkana, Texas . . . .”).
201. See id. at 943 (“[A]n order is being issued today dismissing the petition
of the defendant as failing to state any grounds of relief . . . .”).
202. See Fagerstrom v. United States, 311 F.2d 717, 719–20 (8th Cir. 1963)
(outlining Fagerstrom’s movement between detention facilities).
203. See id. at 719 (“After Fagerstrom’s adjudication he was first taken to the
Federal Correctional Institution at Englewood, Colorado . . . .”).
204. See id. (“[A]pparently in December of 1961—[he] was transferred to the
United States Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri.”).
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discussed below, Fagerstrom is one of many Native youth taken far
away from Native lands and family connections over the decades
to receive “treatment” at the hands of federal officials.
When the U.S. Supreme Court took up the case of Gerald
Gault in 1967, to hold that the goal of alleged treatment did not
justify any and all actions—including dispensing with due
process—it failed to consider the plight of African-American
youth.205 But it also failed to address the problem of American
Indian children being displaced from Native lands for federal
juvenile commitments.206 Nor did it talk about the high numbers
of immigrant youth in federal courts.207 Indeed, it did not
meaningfully discuss the FJDA or federal juvenile delinquency
proceedings at all.208
Gault’s only reference to federal juvenile delinquency
prosecutions was a footnote citing United States v. Morales. 209
Without describing the federal system’s juvenile delinquency
process, or any of the concerns described above, it cited favorably
the Morales District Court’s determination that due process
involuntariness concerns apply even in the context of youth
interrogations.210 But Morales represented a relative outlier
amongst nearly three decades of FJDA cases in terms of its
concerns for specialized protections for youth.211 And in its
critiques and prescriptions regarding juvenile courts, Gault did not

205. See Walker, supra note 63, at 608–09 (“The Gault Court . . . failed to fold
the realities of the treatment of system-involved black children into its calculus
of the process due in juvenile delinquency proceedings.”).
206. See id. (“Gault’s great deficiency is that it erected a flawed prototype
that allowed future courts to turn a blind eye to race disparities in juvenile
delinquency proceedings.”).
207. See id. (arguing that fixing this prototype “will create an institutional
environment in which a wide range of players can work more effectively toward a
wide range of cures for many of the problems.”).
208. Gault, 387 U.S. at 10 (1967) (limiting the courts consideration to six
specifically enumerated issues).
209. See id. at n.96 (citing Morales, 233 F. Supp. 160, 170 (D. Mont. 1964)).
210. See id. (noting, with apparent approval, the lower court’s decision).
211. See, e.g., United. States. ex rel. Reck v. Ragen, 274 F.2d 250, 251–52 (7th
Cir. 1960) (upholding use of statement obtained from a minor with “dull-normal”
intelligence who was questioned by law enforcement over the course of several
days while in custody).
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squarely take on shortcomings in the FJDA or the heartland of
problematic federal juvenile delinquency practices.212
Nevertheless, in 1974, the FJDA was amended by way of the
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA).213
Acknowledging that the federal court system’s treatment of youth
was not developing in sync with states and localities, or
constitutional concerns, the amendments created an express
preference for state juvenile court treatment, if possible, and
required a more formal “certification” to the court by federal
prosecutors to demonstrate that state juvenile court prosecution
was not possible or appropriate.214
Drafters also claimed the 1974 amendments would “provide
basic procedural rights for juveniles who come under federal
jurisdiction and to bring federal procedures up to the standards set
by various model acts, many state codes and court decisions”215
Thus, the new provisions provided youth with rights to a speedy
trial and to counsel.216 It expanded the reach of juvenile treatment
to even capital crimes and those matters where a life sentence
might otherwise be sought.217 In addition, it made clear that only
youth age sixteen or over, if eligible for federal court prosecution,
could face transfer to the adult prosecution docket.218
Yet the “formal” certification process in most circuits did not
result in judicial power to grant or deny federal court access for
juvenile delinquency proceedings.219 Rather, the vast majority held
212. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 10 (failing to include federal juvenile delinquency
practices among the issues considered).
213. See 42 U.S.C. § 5601 (1974) (recognizing the need for reform).
214. See United States v. Cuomo, 525 F.2d 1285, 1286–90 (5th Cir. 1976)
(describing the requirements of the heightened certification and hearing process).
215. See id. at 1293 n.20 (quoting Senate Report that accompanied the 1938
Act).
216. See United States v. Smith, 675 F. Supp. 307, 311 (E.D.N.C. 1987) (“The
1974 Act conferred certain rights upon juveniles, including the right to counsel,
the right to be confined in a facility near the juvenile's home, and the right to a
speedy trial.”).
217. See id. (“The 1974 Act also provided for the first time that juveniles who
were alleged to have committed offenses punishable by death or life imprisonment
were no longer excluded from the protections of the Act.”).
218. See id. (cataloguing further 1974 amendments to the FJDA by the
JJDPA).
219. See Robert Mahini, No Place Like Home: The Availability of Judicial
Review over Certification Decisions Invoking Federal Jurisdiction Under the
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the U.S. Attorney was required to file with the Court a formal
statement indicating why the federal system could exercise
jurisdiction.220 But district courts did not serve as independent fact
finders on the issue and could not assess whether sufficient federal
interest in the matter existed to override the local juvenile justice
system.221
In addition, even under the 1974 amendments federal district
courts were permitted to hold trial “informally” behind closed doors
in judicial chambers.222 Federal juvenile delinquency matters
began evading stakeholder and outside scrutiny in another way
around this time—by no longer having data collected and robustly
evaluated as had occurred under the watch of the Children’s
Bureau.223 Much of the Children’s Bureau’s work seem to be shifted
to OJJDP during this time. 224 And, as noted and will be further
described below, OJJDP data collection and sharing focuses almost
exclusively on state juvenile courts.225

Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1311, 1322–31
(2000) (outlining the circuit split relating to federal court juvenile certification,
with the majority allowing federal prosecutors unchecked discretion relating to
federal charges for children); see also, e.g., United States v. Jarrett, 133 F.3d 519,
539 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that Congress provided to the U.S. Attorney,
exclusively, the discretion to seek certification).
220. See Jarrett, 133 F.3d at 538–39 (“[S]ection 5032 allows a district court to
transfer a juvenile to adult status only after the Attorney General certifies that
‘there is a substantial Federal interest in the case or the offense.’”).
221. See id. at 539 (explaining that the Attorney General’s investigation is
subjective and “[t]here is no congressional invitation for the courts to make a
separate assessment”).
222. See United States v. Cuomo, 525 F.2d 1285, 1293 (5th Cir. 1976) (“The
Act envisions ‘an informal process of adjudication,’ for s 5032 states that ‘the court
may be convened at any time and place within the district, in chambers or
otherwise.’”).
223. See Edward P. Mulvey & Carol A. Shubert, Transfer of Juveniles to Adult
Court: Effects of a Broad Policy in One Court, JUV. JUST. BULL., December 2012
at 3 (“However, it is difficult to gauge the specific effects of these changes because
of the lack of comprehensive and consistent data about transferred adolescent
offenders.”).
224. National Juvenile Court Data Archive, OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQ.
PREVENTION, https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/njcda/asp/history.asp (last visited
Sept. 12, 2020) (explaining that the OJJDP assumed responsibility for data
collection in the 1970s) [perma.cc/9KJM-7XPD].
225. See id. (describing the data collection process and how it focuses
primarily on state courts).
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In the 1980’s and 1990’s, like what was seen on the state level,
federal laws relating to juvenile offenders were amended in
response to perceived increased youth crime.226 New provisions
under the FJDA removed discretion from federal judges on the
issue of transfer for adult prosecution in certain youthful repeat
offender cases.227 And regardless of a youth’s repeat offender
status, judges now could transfer even young teens to face adult
federal prosecution.228 In addition, amendments to the FJDA
during this “tough on crime” era allowed more youth to be certified
away from state juvenile courts to be processed in the federal
system.229 These expansions targeted drug charges, gun matter,
and alleged violent offenses.230
But as the Department of Justice’s Criminal Resource Manual
from this period makes clear, the term “violent” could be
interpreted rather broadly, as the amended FJDA did not
expressly define it.231 In the eyes of the Department even the
attempted use of physical force—not just against a person, but
against property—might be enough for federal prosecutors to
remove a child from state-based juvenile court processes to be
charged as a federal delinquent.232 More than this, the 1997
226. See Mulvey, supra note 223, at 2 (explaining that a “sharp rise in violent
crime” in the 1980s and 1990s “produced intense interest in the causes of juvenile
crime” that resulted in amendments to juvenile delinquency law).
227. See id. at 2–3 (“The movement of adolescents to adult court was no longer
the product of a juvenile court judge exercising his or her discretion.”).
228. See Amy Standefer, The Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act: A Disparate
Impact on Native American Juveniles, 84 MINN. L. REV. 473, 481–84 (1999)
(describing various amendments to FJDA during the 1980s and 1990’s, including
provisions allowing for children as young as 13 to face federal adult sentences).
229. See Mahini, supra note 219, at 1312 (“The Comprehensive Crime Control
Act of 1984 . . . authorizes federal prosecution of juveniles for certain violent
crimes and serious drug offenses. Most of these juvenile offenders had previously
fallen under the exclusive jurisdiction of state authorities.”) (citations omitted).
230. See Standefer, supra note 228, at 479 (1999) (recounting changes that
expanded federal juvenile jurisdiction).
231. See Criminal Resource Manual 120, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-120-juveniledelinquency-proceedings-certification (last updated Jan. 23, 2020) (last visited
Aug. 27, 2020) (offering expansive definition for crime of violence under the FJDA)
[perma.cc/5F2T-9VQ4].
232. See id. (offering expansive definition for crime of violence under the
FJDA). In 2018, this language was held to be unconstitutionally vague by the U.S.
Supreme Court. See Doyle, supra note 174, at 8–9 (citing to Sessions v. Dimaya,
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Manual also advised Assistant U.S. Attorneys that they could
prosecute juveniles in federal court even for low level federal
misdemeanors or infractions when there was sufficient federal
concern in the case.233
C. Ongoing Disconnect from State & Modern Developments
Thus, interest in expanding federal jurisdiction over juveniles
did not end at the turn of the last century.234 As state juvenile
justice systems began building communities of stakeholders
focused on reducing the harmful effects of court involvement upon
children, efforts to sweep increased numbers of youth into federal
courts seemed to increase.235 And while the U.S. Department of
Justice’s OJJDP has been actively working with local juvenile
courts to reduce case numbers over the last two decades, multiple
legislative and other efforts have sought to expand the
Department’s ability to prosecute children in Article III federal
courts.236 Beyond this, improved practice initiatives being
advanced on the state level are not being talked about in the same
way in federal courts.237
584 U.S. 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018)).
233. See Criminal Resource Manual, supra note 231, at 122 (outlining
strategic considerations around processing juveniles in federal delinquency
proceedings relating to A and B level misdemeanors and federal criminal
infractions).
234. See Juvenile Age of Jurisdiction and Transfer to Adult Court Laws, NAT’L
CONF. OF STATE LEGIS., https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminaljustice/juvenile-age-of-jurisdiction-and-transfer-to-adult-court-laws.aspx
(last
visited Sept. 12, 2020) (illustrating the ongoing expanding juvenile jurisdiction)
[perma.cc/TM3S-WC5F].
235. See Laura Langley, Giving Up on Youth: The Dangers of Recent Attempts
to Federalize Juvenile Crime, 25 J. JUV. L. 1, 1 (2005) (“Congressional support for
the expansion of federal jurisdiction over juveniles has mounted since the late
1990s.”); see also Juan Alberto Arteaga, Juvenile (In)Justice: Congressional
Attempts to Abrogate the Procedural Rights of Juvenile Defendants, 102 COLUM.
L. REV. 1051, 1052 n.6 (2002) (cataloging a range of efforts in the late 1990’s to
expand the ability of federal prosecutors to hold youth accountable).
236. See Langley, supra note 235, at 12 (describing legislative initiatives such
as the Consequences for Juvenile Offender Acts of 1999 and 2001, as well as the
2003 Gang Prevention and Effective Deterrence Act).
237. See id. at 6 (“The rehabilitative focus of states’ juvenile justice system is
not replicated at the federal level.”).
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For instance, defender and prosecutor expertise in
child-centered lawyering, with a focus on adolescent development
and positive supports, is considered an emerging norm and best
practice in state courts.238 Yet, there appears to be no similar
movement shaping practices in federal courts.239 Assistant U.S.
Attorneys and federal defenders generally have not been part of
national conversations around expanded roles that account for
youth trauma, adolescent needs, or supporting teen capabilities.240
Indeed, reminiscent of 1990s “tough on crime” rhetoric, the
current manual for federal prosecutors begins the section on
juvenile delinquency matters by directing line attorneys to the
Organized Crime and Gang Section of the Criminal Division for
“consultation on all issues pertaining to the prosecution of
juveniles, including documentation to support prosecution.”241 It
also suggests an “arrest now, determine grounds for federal
involvement later” approach to juvenile offender cases. Thus, the
process may be used as the punishment in some matters where
ultimately the case does not meet certification standards.242
The federal judiciary and probation departments are similarly
distant from contemporary conversations regarding improved
practices for juvenile justice matters.243 For instance, on the state
level juvenile court judges regularly convene trainings and share
materials to enhance trauma-informed, evidence practices for

238. See Barbara Ann Atwood, The Uniform Representation of Children in
Abuse, Neglect, and Custody Proceedings Act: Bridging the Divide Between
Pragmatism and Idealism, 42 FAM. L.Q. 63, 67 (2008) (explaining that the
Representation of Children Act “required child-centered representation”).
239. See Langley, supra note 235, at 6 (“The rehabilitative focus of states’
juvenile justice system is not replicated at the federal level.”).
240. See Trauma-Informed Legal Advocacy: A Resource for Juvenile Defense
Attorneys, NAT’L CHILD TRAUMATIC STRESS NETWORK at 1–2 (2018) (explaining the
need for attorneys involved in the juvenile justice system to be trauma-informed
advocates). There are, of course, notable exceptions. Individual federal defenders
including Mollie Spaulding in St. Louis, Caryll Alpert in Nashville, and Leila
Morgan in San Diego are well-versed in emerging youth justice considerations
and leaders in the field.
241. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-8.001 (2018).
242. See id. at § 9-8.120 (“The Department does not interpret 18 U.S.C. § 5032
as requiring certification prior to the filing of a complaint and issuance of an
arrest warrant.”).
243. See infra notes 244–250 and accompanying text.
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juvenile delinquency matters that make their way to the court.244
More than this, they are among the stakeholders seeking to reduce
juvenile court case numbers, including by supporting diversion
programs that help to address DMC and now RED as required by
OJJDP and the JJDPA.245 In contrast, federal district court judges
generally are not part of the discussion.246 There is some evidence
that in years past federal judges did receive training relating to
youth prosecution generally and juvenile delinquency matters
particularly.247 But such guidance—as offered at a 1976 convening
of the Federal Judicial Center for newly appointed federal judges—
has been scant at best.248 And comprising little more than one page
of the 215 page convening manuscript,249 it is clear juvenile
delinquency matters have not received the kind of evidence-based
attention in the federal system as is occurring in the states. 250
It is also clear that federal courts are not collecting and
publicly sharing the same kind of granular data for delinquency
matters that states have been in recent decades.251 Numbers of
arrests, prosecutions, disposition types, and youth population
statistics including race are among the details that are culled by
local juvenile courts and provided to OJJDP and otherwise

244. See Trauma-Informed Courts, NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUV. & FAM. CT. JUDGES,
https://www.ncjfcj.org/child-welfare-and-juvenile-law/trauma-informed-courts/
(last visited Aug. 27, 2020) (“To date, the NCJFCJ has conducted more than 35
court trauma assessments in a diverse selection of juvenile and family, tribal, and
state courts from around the country, representing both urban and rural locales.”)
[perma.cc/SQ98-XRVC].
245. See How We Can Help You and Your Community, NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUV.
& FAM. CT. JUDGES, https://www.ncjfcj.org/about/how-we-can-help-you/ (last
visited Aug. 27, 2020) (describing the assistance that NCJFCJ provides)
[perma.cc/HVL2-R5PJ].
246. See Mahini, supra note 219, at 1352 (“[T]he purposes and underlying
effects of JJDPA have repeatedly received inadequate judicial consideration.”).
247. See Proceedings of the Seminar for Newly Appointed United States
District Court Judges, 75 F.R.D. 89, 297–304 (1976) (advising federal judges on
the sentencing of youth and juvenile offenders).
248. See id. (providing guidance only on the Juvenile Delinquency and Youth
Corrections Acts).
249. See id. (spanning only from pages 297 to 299).
250. See id. (lacking specific evidence-based data about federal juvenile
delinquency matters).
251. See WILLIAM ADAMS & JULIE SAMUELS ET AL., TRIBAL YOUTH IN THE
FEDERAL JUSTICE SYSTEM x–xi (May 2011) (analyzing the available federal data).
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provided to the public.252 State juvenile court systems must also
account for and classify the kinds of facilities might be used to
house both pre-trial and post-disposition, including non-secure
facilities, secure juvenile detention facilities, and secure
correctional facilities where adults might also be detained.253
This has resulted in numerous annual reports and
assessments that provide relative transparency and share
strategic plans across jurisdictions.254 Historically the federal court
system has not been included in data collection under the
JJDPA.255 Thus there is no clear sense of just how many youth
have been charged in federal court in recent years and determined
to be delinquent, for what, where exactly they have been held
pre-trial, and to what facilities they were sent and for how long as
a result of either disposition or sentencing.256 This past year the
JJDPA was reauthorized, reaffirming requirements for states. It
was also expanded to expressly adopt requirements around
evidence-based practice which “reflects the new knowledge that
has developed in the field,” including information on RED. 257 But
252. See, e.g., Spotlight on Juvenile Justice Initiatives: A State by State
Survey, FED. ADVISORY COMM. ON JUV. JUST. 10–52 (May 2017),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/251078.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2020)
(providing compilation of data reported by state SAG groups, including use of
evidence-based practices and DMC improvements) [perma.cc/63MJ-UPRY].
253. See An Overview of the Statutory and Regulatory Requirements for
Monitoring Facilities for Compliance with the Deinstitutionalization of Status
Offenders, Separation, and Jail Removal Provisions of the Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act, OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION 5 (Sept.
2019),
https://ojjdp.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh176/files/media/document/ComplianceMonitoring-TA-Tool.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2020) (describing the wide range of
data collection required by states receiving federal juvenile justice funding)
[perma.cc/5BZR-3CQU].
254. See, e.g., Juvenile Justice Model Data Project: Final Technical Report,
NAT’L
CTR.
FOR
JUV.
JUST.
viii
(Oct.
2018),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/grants/254492.pdf (last visited Sept. 20,
2020) (“[OJJDP] has invested in improving juvenile justice data and increasing
consistency across states and localities through the Juvenile Justice Model Data
Project”) [https://perma.cc/R5UZ-TP35].
255. See OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, supra note 253, at 20–21
(noting that core requirements under the JJDPA apply to state court decisions
and not federal cases involving youth).
256. See id. (lacking information about federal reporting requirements).
257. See Reauthorization of the JJDPA, COAL. FOR JUV. JUST.,
http://www.juvjustice.org/juvenile-justice-and-delinquency-prevention-
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it was not expanded to clearly apply to federal juvenile delinquency
matters.258
V. Contemporary Case Studies and Further Concerns Regarding
Article III Delinquency
State juvenile justice systems obviously handle many more
youth prosecutions than the federal court system.259 But as we
discussed in our prior essay, which related to adult prosecution of
youth in federal court, the exact number of youthful defendant
cases in federal courts in recent years is illusive at best. 260 And
information about federal delinquency cases, the subject of this
essay, is even harder to ascertain than data about federal
prosecution of youth as adults.261 When youth are prosecuted as
adults, those matters become public proceedings that may be
watched or monitored by interested stakeholders.262 Because
federal delinquency cases are considered confidential cases, a
member of the public cannot request such case files from a District
Court clerk’s office, or review dockets on Pacer.263
More than this, as suggested throughout this essay, careful
data collection for federal delinquency cases does not appear to fall
to any federal agency or group.264 While OJJDP requires every
act/reauthorization-jjdpa (last visited Aug. 28, 2020) (explaining the effects of the
2018 updates to the JJDPA) [perma.cc/6LCJ-KEBN].
258. See OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, supra note 120 (regarding
the 2018–19 reauthorization of the JJDPA and accompanying text).
259. See ADAMS, supra note 251, at xi (analyzing federal data).
260. See Quinn & McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 553 (pointing out the difficulty
of trying to pin down the exact number of youth convicted as adults in federal
court each year for wrongdoings committed before they were eighteen years old).
261. See, e.g., NAT’L CTR. FOR JUV. JUST., supra note 254, at viii (“[OJJDP] has
invested in improving juvenile justice data and increasing consistency across
states and localities through the Juvenile Justice Model Data Project”).
262. See Maria Sprague & Mark Hardin, Coordination of Juvenile and
Criminal Court Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings, 35 U. OF LOUISVILLE J. OF
FAM. L. 239, 274 (1993) (“[C]riminal court proceeding[s] [are] typically public
proceeding[s] and juvenile court matters are generally confidential.”).
263. See Henning, supra note 137, at 394 (“Juvenile court proceedings in most
states remain closed to the public, but states often allow public access to juvenile
records that involve arrests or adjudications for serious offenses.”).
264. See Data Collection Requirements Under H. 6964, COAL. FOR JUV. JUST.,
1–3,
https://www.juvjustice.org/sites/default/files/resource-
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jurisdiction and SAG group to submit data for state juvenile
delinquency cases, with a particular view towards monitoring
impact on vulnerable groups, where youth are confined, and for
how long, no similar OJJDP requirement appears to apply to
federal delinquency matters.265 The Administrative Office of the
United States Courts (AOC) does collect and publicly post a wide
range of information about both civil and criminal cases processed
in the federal system.266 However, the hybrid civil-criminal nature
of delinquency matters may be contributing to delinquency cases
being overlooked in AOC’s data sets and online materials.267
For instance, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 604, AOC is required to
report annually on judicial caseloads, presenting data regarding
district court civil and criminal matters filed, terminated, and
pending.268 Criminal defendant data sets appear to include
information for “transfers.”269 Assuming this refers to juvenile
matters transferred for adult prosecution, the data does provide
some information relating to child defendant cases.270 For instance,
it appears that the government commenced 464 juvenile transfers
in 2009 in contrast to 2019, when it commenced only 213
transfers.271 These tables go on to provide raw numbers for
files/Data%20Collection%20Requirements.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2020) (failing
to indicate which federal agency is responsible for data collection)
[perma.cc/2ER9-MED3].
265. See id. (stating the requirements for data collection on a state level with
minimal information about federal requirements).
266. See Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS.,
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/analysis-reports/federal-judicialcaseload-statistics (last visited Aug. 28, 2020) (referencing criminal matters
commenced, terminated or pending, including transfers, in Table D1)
[https://perma.cc/WZ82-SE2H].
267. See FLICKER, supra note 30, at 5 (noting the similarities between criminal
and juvenile courts).
268. See 28 U.S.C. § 604(a)(2) (outlining the duties of Director of the
Administrative Office to examine and report statistical date about the business
of the courts).
269. See ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., supra note 266 (referencing criminal matters
commenced, terminated or pending, including transfers, in Table D1).
270. See id. (citing data for criminal matters commenced, terminated or
pending, including transfers, in Table D1).
271. See Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS.,
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/analysis-reports/federal-judicialcaseload-statistics (last visited Aug. 28, 2020) (providing annual data for civil and
criminal cases processed in U.S. District Courts from April 1 to March 31)
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transfers terminated (400 in 2009 and 185 in 2019). But they do
not explain what, exactly, that termination reflects. 272
Transfer termination might include cases from the year
before, not just the reporting year.273 In addition, termination data
might also capture case dismissals as well as a successful transfer
followed by conviction. In this way, it is hard to know how many
youths, exactly, are prosecuted as adults in federal courts each
year and sentenced as such.274 More than this, termination of
transfer might also mean the case was not transferred but
permitted to proceed as a federal juvenile delinquency matter.275
But it is hard to know.276 Indeed, the publicly available AOC data
sets and tables we have reviewed do not specifically reference
federal juvenile delinquency cases at all.277
Yet, the information publicly available does suggest that the
same youth groups who predominated in federal prosecutions prior
to the 1938 enactment of the FJDA—Native American and
immigrant youth—still receive heightened attention by federal
prosecutors when compared to other youth.278 Potential continued
[perma.cc/4YHZ-82AE].
272. And as we discussed in our prior work, deeply conflicting claims also
have been made about federal juvenile cases. For instance, despite OCA’s data
indicating that more than 1500 federal transfer matters were commenced
between 2010 and 2015, see Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics Tables, 2010 to
2015 (reporting a high of 433 transfer matters per year and a low of 228 during
this period), the Federal Sentencing Commission has declared that a total of only
fifty-two youth were sentenced as adults in federal court between 2010 and 2015.
See Youthful Offenders in the Federal System, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2 (2017),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/researchpublications/2017/20170525_youthful-offenders.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2020)
(offering the fifty-two-case count number as among the figures supporting a “key
finding” that “[t]here were very few youthful offenders under the age of 18
sentenced in the federal system”) [perma.cc/XKM2-S6BX].
273. See id. (describing date ranges for data sets).
274. See id. at vii–viii (describing current practice for transferring youths to
adult status).
275. See id. (describing current practice for transferring youths to adult
status).
276. See Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, supra note 271 and
accompanying text.
277. See generally Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, supra note 271
(providing annual data for civil and criminal cases processed in U.S. District
Courts from April 1 to March 31).
278. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 272, at 26 (“The second most
common offense among youthful offenders was immigration offenses.”).
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use of the largely invisible federal juvenile justice system to
address youthful actions of these marginalized groups, we believe,
demands further scrutiny.279 But we are also concerned about any
youthful offender who might be detained or confined in connection
with federal delinquency charges, which may be occurring in any
number of settings even during the COVID-19 pandemic without
meaningful check or oversight.280
A. Native Youth
Historically, Indigenous children281 have suffered from
over-involvement in the federal justice system due to a range of
complex historical reasons, including lack of sufficient support and
respect for Native communities, and complex overlapping
jurisdictional possibilities.282 The federal courts’ failure to keep up
with developments in juvenile justice is particularly concerning for
Indigenous children.283 Their overrepresentation in the federal
system—paired with what may be a disproportionate likelihood of
being charged as a child—results in fewer procedural protections
279. See Addie C. Rolnick, Untangling the Web: Juvenile Justice in Indian
Country, 19 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 49, 51 (2016) (identifying “a substantial
indictment of the juvenile justice system's failure as a tool of law enforcement and
as a mechanism for rehabilitating and treating at-risk youth”).
280. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OJJDP COVID–19 Guidance: State Juvenile
Detention and Correctional Facilities, 1–2 (2020) (providing non-binding guidance
for managing the health risks of the COVID-19 pandemic within detention and
correctional facilities).
281. We have referred to Native American children in multiple ways
throughout this subsection. None precisely captures the identity of the population
about whom we are concerned, and Indigenous peoples have, at times, rejected
monolithic identifiers. Government documents often refer to this population as
“tribal youth.”
282. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 272, at 29 (“Specifically, the federal
government has jurisdiction exclusive of the states over crimes committed in
Indian Country by or against Native Americans 54 and over major felonies
committed in Indian Country by a Native American against another Native
American or other person.”).
283. See William Adams et al., Tribal Youth in the Federal Justice System, x–
xi (2011) (“82% of entering [Indian Country] juveniles entrants had been
adjudicated delinquent compared to only 38% of entering non-[Indian Country]
juveniles who were adjudicated delinquent”). But see Adams et al. supra note 283,
at x (noting poorly reported data and difficulty distinguishing between children
adjudicated as adults and children adjudicated as delinquents).
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without the benefit of a range of youth-centered features that are
seen as best practices in state juvenile courts. 284 Even though these
children are formally treated as juveniles, they are still more likely
than non-Native children to be confined in a secure facility as a
result of their prosecution.285 The most recently available data
show that Indigenous children face higher rates of involvement in
the federal justice system, 286 higher rates of adjudication,287 and
longer sentences than non-Native children in federal courts.288
The patchwork of authorities governing tribal territory—
described by Professor Addie C. Rolnick as a “web” 289—is “easily
the most complicated in the nation and among the most
complicated in the world.” 290 Indigenous children fall into the
jurisdiction of numerous overlapping, sometimes concurrent
jurisdictions, including tribal, federal, state criminal, and state
284. See discussion supra Part III(0) (describing ongoing modern disconnects
between federal and state juvenile prosecutorial practices); see also Rolnick, supra
note 279, at 124 (2016) (“[T]he agency-level policy is focused primarily on adult
offenders, and the officials are more likely to have expertise in adult crime and
adult detention.”).
285. See Rolnick, supra note 279, at 105 (“Indian youth prosecuted in the
federal system are more likely than other federally prosecuted youth to be placed
in secure confinement, but they may be less likely to be charged as adults.”).
286. See Adams et al., supra note 283, at 11 (“The conviction rate for [Indian
Country] juveniles (89%) was higher than for non-[Indian Country] juveniles
(80%)”). But see Major George Lavine, Protect our Military Children: Congress
Must Rectify Jurisdiction on Military Installations to Address Juvenile-onJuvenile Sexual Assault, 18 WYO. L. REV. 115, 123–24 (2018) (noting that some
federal prosecutors fail to pursue juvenile prosecution matters in Indian country
due to disinterest in the legal issues and a desire to focus on more complex cases).
287. See Rolnick, supra note 279, at 126 (“In the past decade, about half of the
juveniles under federal jurisdiction (at any stage) were Native American, as were
more than half of the juveniles in Bureau of Prisons custody.”).
288. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-591, REPORT TO
CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, NATIVE AMERICAN YOUTH: INVOLVEMENT IN JUSTICE
SYSTEMS AND INFORMATION ON GRANTS TO HELP ADDRESS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
44 (2018) (finding that, from 2010–2016, 52% of Indigenous children were
sentenced to between thirteen and thirty-six months while 62% of non-Native
children were sentenced to less than twelve months).
289. See Rolnick, supra note 279, at 83–84 (arguing that “web” is a more
accurate metaphor than the commonly used “maze” for describing the authorities
governing criminal prosecution for crimes committed on tribal lands).
290. See AM. INDIAN LAW CTR. & WALTER R. MCDONALD & ASSOC., STUDY OF
TRIBAL AND ALASKA NATIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEMS, FINAL REPORT 5 (1992)
(addressing the complex structure of governmental power on Indian
reservations).
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juvenile court.291 Despite professing the value of tribal
self-determination, the federal government has consistently used
the fact that Native tribes lie within federal borders to justify
hemming in tribal sovereignty.292 A tribe’s power to handle matters
involving Indigenous children is limited by a number of carve-outs
which give federal courts the option to exercise jurisdiction over a
child.293
Most relevant among these carve-outs is the district court’s
power to prosecute Indigenous children who commit serious
“person” or “property” offenses under the Major Crimes Act.294
Indigenous children are charged in federal court with “person”
offenses at about eight times the rate of non-Native children, and
“property” offenses at about five times the rate.295 These two
categories cover all the offenses in the Major Crimes Act and make
up close to fourth-fifths of all charges Indigenous children face in
federal court. 296 Because of this, they more often find themselves
targeted by federal prosecutors and dragged into a justice system
with fewer procedural protections and little wherewithal to
properly handle the special considerations involved in prosecuting
a child.297
While state courts handle non-Native children who commit the
“person offenses” listed in the Major Crimes Act, they lack
jurisdiction over Indigenous children who offend on tribal lands.298
291. See Rolnick, supra note 279, at 82–110 (laying out the complex
jurisdictional web governing Indigenous children, including the mystifying
concurrent—but not coextensive—federal-tribal jurisdiction).
292. See AM. INDIAN L. CTR. & WALTER R. MCDONALD & ASSOC., supra note 290,
at 5 (summarizing the history of the relationship between Indigenous tribes and
the federal government); see also Rolnick, supra note 279, at 60–71 (describing
historical pivots in the federal government’s attitude toward tribal selfdetermination).
293. See Adams et al., supra note 283, at 11–12 (describing the impact of The
General Crimes Act of 1817, The Major Crimes Act of 1885, and Public Law 280).
294. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (defining offenses committed within Indian
country).
295. See Adams et al., supra note 283, at 49–50 (analyzing prosecution data
from the Executive Office for the U.S. Attorneys)
296. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 288, at 39 (displaying
data about the type of offenses charged to Native American youth).
297. See Adams et al., supra note 283, at viii (stating that federal cases
against trial youth face many processing challenges).
298. See id. at 11–12 (describing state jurisdiction in “Indian Country”).
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In those cases, Article III federal courts take up the case,
overriding tribal jurisdiction.299 According to Professor Rolnick,
this comes from an apparent belief by the federal government that
Indigenous children are not punished harshly enough by tribal
courts.300 Indeed, there have been occasions where federal
prosecutors have chosen to prosecute an Indigenous child a second
time after they had already been prosecuted in tribal court for the
same crime, resulting in increased sentences or even conflicting
dispositions.301
It should be noted that data concerning the fate of Indigenous
children involved in any justice system are exceedingly difficult to
parse.302 Federal data collection is supposed to improve in the
coming years due to the passage of the Tribal Law and Order
Act.303 However, there are, in fact, far more updated and detailed
statistical reports available regarding the procedures for collecting
data in cases involving Indigenous defendants than there are
actual reports about case outcomes.304
299. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 288, at 42 (stating DOJ
officials believe the jurisdictional structure “requires the federal government to
prosecute” MCA offenses when state courts cannot) (emphasis added).
300. See Rolnick, supra note 279, at 103 (describing the motivations behind
the Major Crimes Act of 1885).
301. See Addie C. Rolnick & Neelum Arya, A Tangled Web of Justice:
American Indian and Alaska Native Youth in Federal, State, and Tribal Justice
Systems, 5 CAMP. FOR YOUTH JUST. POL’Y BRIEF 25–26 (2008) (citing United States
v. Male Juvenile, 280 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2002), where a fourteen-year-old boy
was sentenced by tribal court to six months for stealing electronics from two
houses, and was subsequently sentenced by a federal court to twenty-four months
for the same incident, resulting in placement for two-and-a-half years; and United
States v. Juvenile Female, 869 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1989), where a seventeen-yearold girl was arrested on drunk driving charges and given probation and treatment
after the tribe assumed jurisdiction in an express agreement with the FBI, and
was still charged again later in federal court for the same incident).
302. See Adams et al., supra note 283, at x.
All juvenile cases in the federal system begin as juvenile delinquency
proceedings, and it is challenging to determine the proportion of
juveniles that are transferred to adult status and handled as criminal
cases. There is no standard method for recording when this occurs
across agencies and the available data do not present a consistent view.
303. See Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat.
2258 (2010) (outlining the reporting requirements for crime data in tribal
communities).
304. See Indian Country Justice Statistics, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS.,
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=200000 (last visited Aug. 28, 2020)
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B. Latino and Immigrant Youth

The federal Children’s Bureau and Wickersham Commission
reported on high numbers of immigrant youth being arrested and
prosecuted in federal court at the start of the last century.305 Today
immigrant children still appear prominently in federal
prosecutions, with a good number apparently arrested for
immigration related crimes.306 In 2018, 64% of all federal arrests—
over 125,000 cases—involved non-U.S. citizens.307 Approximately
113,000 of those immigrant arrests—or 84% were based upon
immigration-related offenses.308
According to the federal Marshals Service, in 2018, forty-nine
children age seventeen or younger were among the federal
immigration arrestees processed.309 It is unclear if they were
ultimately charged and, if so, whether they were processed as
adults or in delinquency cases.310 In addition, just as studies have
shown that the official statistics regarding Native youth entering
the federal court system as delinquents may not capture the entire
picture,311 we fear the same holds true for immigrant youth.312
According to the federal Sentencing Commission, of all youthful
offenders age twenty five or younger who were processed in the
(listing only “Tribal Crime Data-Collection Activities” reports for the last decade
except for the occasional Indian Country jail census report) [perma.cc/XB7JTRA6].
305. See supra notes 111–115 and accompanying text.
306. See MARK MOTIVANS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, AND
THE FEDERAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, 1998-2018 14 (2019) (explaining that in 2018,
almost 50 children under the age of 17 were arrested for immigration related
crimes).
307. See id. at 1–11 (showing tables of federal arrests in various districts and
the percentages of non-U.S. citizens that were arrested).
308. See id. (demonstrating, in table form, that a majority of the offenses were
immigration-related).
309. See id. at 14–15 (setting forth, in table form, the number of federal
immigration arrests by age).
310. See id. at 16 (explaining that the Customs and Border Patrol does not
publish its number of federal criminal arrests).
311. See Quinn & McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 554 (citing to Urban Institute
study, which suggests official statistics fail to fully capture the extent of federal
prosecution of Native youth).
312. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 272, at 21 (stating that immigration
offenses are of the most common committed by youthful offenders).
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federal court system, nearly 60% were Hispanic.313 This finding,
along with the recent focus on arrest and fast-track prosecution in
certain border states in the United States driving up immigrant
case prosecution numbers, there is reason to believe that more
than forty nine immigrant juveniles were prosecuted in federal
court in 2018 and since.314
Anecdotally, as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, some
federal public defenders report lower case numbers along the
border in recent months—including fewer youthful offender
matters.315 But cases processed before U.S. Magistrate judges
rather than District Court judges may be worth further attention
in terms of cases handled in the past and in the days ahead.316 This
is because it appears federal petty offense matters, however they
are being defined, are not included as part of the data shared by
the OCA when they are heard by federal magistrate judges. 317 So,
for instance, even though the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
issued a written decision upholding the certification of Mexican
national, R.P., who was charged at age seventeen as a delinquent
for immigration related offenses, his case may have been invisible
for OCA data collection purposes if delinquency findings are
313. See id. at 16–17 (describing youthful offenders only as Hispanic, Black,
White, or other, including Native American youth in the “other” category and
questioning the Sentencing Commission data that only 9 Native American youth
under the age of 18 were sentenced in federal court between 2010 and 2015—
representing only 2.9% of youthful offenders).
314. See MOTIVANS, supra note 306, at 14 (providing the statistic that fortynine immigrant juveniles were known to be prosecuted in 2018).
315. See Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2019, ADMIN. OFF. OF U.S. CTS.,
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics2019 (last visited Sept. 11, 2020) (explaining the decrease in federal public
defenders’ cases) [https://perma.cc/N8AA-UCEA]. Thanks to the attorneys in the
nation’s southern region federal public defenders’ offices who shared their
experiences regarding such matters in recent months.
316. See, e.g., United States v. Juvenile Male, 595 F.3d 885, 906 (9th Cir.
2010) (upholding certification of juvenile charged with immigration relating
offense, who case was heard before a federal magistrate rather than District
Court judge).
317. See Statistical Tables for the Federal Judiciary, ADMIN. OFF. OF U.S. CTS.
Statistics
Tables,
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/analysisreports/statistical-tables-federal-judiciary (last visited Aug. 29, 2020) (noting that
annual data for criminal cases processed in U.S. District Courts in Tables D, D1,
and D4 do not include petty offense cases handled by federal magistrates)
[perma.cc/2SBH-CMNY].
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labeled as petty matters.318 Thus while some lament the ongoing
failure of federal officials to formally process petty offenses of
children living on U.S. military bases,319 both Native and Latino
youth may not be receiving the same grace on a consistent basis.
With ongoing increased federal law enforcement presence in
our cities, it is even more important to monitor federal engagement
with Latino and immigrant youth.320 Even as local mayors may be
urging less involvement by federal officials in city affairs,321 in the
past federal agents culled information from local gang databases
to supposedly round up those immigrants believed to be
undesirable.322 But such databases have been long understood to
be unreliable and filled with names—frequently Latino—that may
have no connection at all to gangs.323 Some localities maintain
318. See Juvenile Male, 595 F.3d at 885 (explaining that juvenile delinquency
prosecution for immigration related offense whose case was heard before a federal
magistrate rather than District Court judge).
319. See Emily Roman, Where There’s A Will, There’s a Way, Command
Authority Over Juvenile Misconduct on Areas of Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction
and Utilization of Juvenile Review Boards, 2015 ARMY L. 35, 35 (2015) (recounting
frustration around lack of federal prosecution of youthful transgressions on
military bases, such as petty offenses like shoplifting); see also George Lavine,
Protect our Military Children: Congress Must Rectify Jurisdiction on Military
Installations to Address Juvenile-on-Juvenile Sexual Assault, 18 WYO. L. REV.
115, 119–21 (2018) (reporting on federal prosecutors’ lack of interest in
prosecuting a range of crimes relating to military youth, including sexual
offenses).
320. See, e.g., Kristine Phillips, Federal Agents Head to Detroit, Cleveland,
Milwaukee as Operation Legend Continues, USA TODAY (July 29, 2020, 11:25 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/07/29/operation-legend-dojto-send-officers-to-detroit-cleveland-milwaukee/5535490002/ (last updated Aug.
6, 2020, 4:21 PM) (last visited Aug. 29, 2020) (reporting that a diverse array of
officers from the FBI, Drug Enforcement Agency, and other federal entities will
be deployed in cities to expand the President’s “federal crime initiative”)
[perma.cc/2LBX-XSRE].
321. See id. (noting that many local mayors have expressed concerns about
federal intervention into their localities, fearing overreach and use of excessive
force).
322. See Stephano Bloch, Are You in a Gang Database?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/03/opinion/los-angeles-gangdatabase.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2020) (explaining that a university professor’s
name was erroneously included in a gang database in the 1990’s and expressing
concern of increased federal use of such unreliable lists under the Trump
administration) [perma.cc/3S9V-889C].
323. See id. (“[S]uch crimes of misidentification have been going on for years
with untold consequences.”); see also Maria Zamudio, Federal Immigration Agents
Used Chicago Gang Database Thousands of Times, NPR ONLINE (Apr. 12, 2019),
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similar methods for monitoring those believed to be engaged in
#BlackLivesMatter and other protest activities. 324 Under the
President’s direction to federal agents to “dominate” and bring
“order” to our cities, BIPOC youth may find themselves swept up
in such federal crackdowns.325
C. Federal Detention and Confinement

https://www.npr.org/local/309/2019/04/12/712788497/federal-immigrationagencies-used-chicago-gang-database-thousands-of-times (last visited Aug. 29,
2020) (reporting on the lawsuit by the MacArthur Justice Center, challenging
Chicago’s gang database practice, which resulted in false claims about local
residents including Wilmer Catalan-Ramirez and their arrest by federal
immigration officials) [perma.cc/UM63-79NR]; see also YOUTH JUSTICE COALITION
REALSEARCH ACTION RESEARCH CENTER, TRACKED AND TRAPPED: YOUTH OF COLOR,
GANG DATABASES, AND GANG INJUNCTIONS 4 (2012) (describing how youth of color
had their names and photographs added to a California gang database without
having engaged in any criminal conduct or being charged with wrongdoing).
324. See Kristina Libby, How to Spot Police Surveillance Tools, POPULAR
MECHANICS
(June
12,
2020),
https://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/security/a32851975/policesurveillance-tools-protest-guide/ (last visited Aug. 29, 2020) (cataloging ways
local police may monitor individuals in the vicinity of protest activities, including
cameras, drones, cell-site simulators including stingrays and dustboxes)
[perma.cc/K6J6-A5GW]; see also Antonia Farzan, Memphis Police Used Fake
Facebook Account to Monitor Black Lives Matter, Trial Reveals, WASH. POST (Aug.
23,
2018,
6:32
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morningmix/wp/2018/08/23/memphis-police-used-fake-facebook-account-to-monitorblack-lives-matter-trial-reveals/ (last visited Aug. 29, 2020) (describing how police
used social media to, among other things, collect names of individuals based upon
“likes” that seemed related to the Black Lives Matter movement) [perma.cc/KJ4SAPG3].
325. See Caitlin Conant, 2020 Daily Trail Markers: Trump Declares, “We will
dominate
the
streets,”
CBS
NEWS
(June
1,
2020),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/2020-daily-trail-markers-trump-declares-wewill-dominate-the-streets/ (last visited Aug. 29, 2020) (outlining the Trump
administration’s aggressive response to Black Lives
Matter protests)
[perma.cc/U8P7-AXYA]; see also David Sirota, Trump’s Plan to Use the Military
to “Dominate” American Cities Must Be Stopped, JACOBIN MAG. (June 5, 2020),
https://jacobinmag.com/2020/06/donald-trump-military-federal-enforcementprotests (last visited Aug. 29, 2020) (contrasting President Trump’s plans to send
federal agents into cities with actions during the 1950’s that were intended to
protect the rights of African-American youth seeking to desegregate schools)
[https://perma.cc/97PW-VTFG].
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Youth involved in federal delinquency matters may be
detained in any number of facilities or institutions. 326 And as was
the case for youth like Douglas Kemp and William Fagerstrom
during the middle of the last century, such locations are often far
away from the youth’s family and community.327 This adds to the
challenge of family engagement and contact, and youthful offender
reentry.328 For example, youth awaiting resolution of pending
federal delinquency charges are managed and housed by U.S.
Marshals at a range of facilities.329 And either the Federal
Probation Department or Federal Bureau of Prisons generally
becomes responsible for youth who have been adjudicated as
delinquent.330 It also appears that all three groups contract with
numerous entities all around the country for purposes of detaining
such children.331
For instance, the Federal Bureau of Prisons website says that
“Federal juveniles are a special population with special
designation needs.”332 It goes on to explain that each youth,
therefore, is “placed in a facility that provides the appropriate level
326. See THE NAT’L ACAD. PRESS, JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE 154–55
(2001) (explaining that there are different methods among different jurisdictions
in the realm of policing of juveniles and their subsequent detainment).
327. See Fagerstrom v. United States., 311 F.2d 717, 719 (8th Cir. 1963)
(explaining that after his adjudication, Fagerstrom was relocated from his home
in Missouri to a Federal Correctional Institution in Colorado).
328. See THE NAT’L ACAD. PRESS, supra note 326, at 157–58 (stating that there
are many different ways of handling juvenile prosecution and they often end up
in different locations).
329. See Defendant and Prisoner Custody and Detention, U.S. MARSHALS
SERV., https://www.usmarshals.gov/prisoner/detention.htm (last visited Aug. 29,
2020) (“It is the responsibility of the USMS to provide for the custody, handling,
and detention of juvenile delinquents in accordance with the Federal Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act.”) [perma.cc/3AHC-CVXS].
330. See THE NAT’L ACAD. PRESS, supra note 326, at 204 (explaining the
general practices for adjudicating juvenile offenders).
331. See REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE USE OF RESTRICTIVE
HOUSING,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
JUST.
61
(Jan.
2016),
https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/report-and-recommendations-concerninguse-restrictive-housing (last visited Aug. 29, 2020) (noting 12 contract entities
willing to hold youthful offenders in connection with federal delinquency cases,
seven secure facilities and five non-secure, all mostly in the western part of the
country) [perma.cc/WT96-K9EW].
332. Juveniles,
FED.
BUREAU
OF
PRISONS
https://www.bop.gov/inmates/custody_and_care/juveniles.jsp (last visited Aug.
29, 2020) [https://perma.cc/N2ZM-U2JR].
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of programming and security.”333 But other than characterizing
such facilities as either “secure” or “non-secure,” it does not provide
a list of such facilities, their locations, or the supposed
programming provided at each.334 One recent report from the
Bureau of Justice Statistics indicates that “[t]he BOP held 42
prisoners age 17 or younger in private contract facilities at
year-end 2017.”335 But this information may raise more questions
than it answers.336 For instance, does the use of the term prisoner
here include youth who are charged and/or adjudicated in
delinquency matters, or does this relate only to youth imprisoned
after being sentenced as adults? Does this figure include youth
housed by BOP at facilities that are not considered prisons? And
what about youthful offenders, detained in connection with federal
delinquency matters, who are now over age seventeen?337 The
same holds true for AOC, the U.S. Marshals Service, and Federal
Probation—no specific details containing this information can be
found on their websites regarding the number of facilities in use
for juvenile delinquency cases, where they are, or what
programming they may or may not provide.338 A call to the federal
judicial data hotline did not provide any further clarity.339 Instead
staff there indicated the federal courts did not capture information

333. See id. (explaining the general protocol of juvenile detention centers).
334. See id. (characterizing and describing the facilities without providing a
specific list of the different locations or programming).
335. See JENNIFER BRONSON & E. ANN CARSON, PRISONERS IN 2017 4–5 (Bureau
of Justice Statistics (BJA 2019) (evaluating the populations at year-end of
different age groups).
336. See WENDY SAWYER, YOUTH CONFINEMENT; THE WHOLE PIE 2019 1 (Prison
Policy Initiative 2019) (pointing out problems with the Bureau of Prisons data
regarding youthful offenders).
337. See id. (pointing out problems with the Bureau of Prisons data regarding
youthful offenders).
338. See, e.g., 2001 Intergovernmental Services Agreement Between U.S.
Marshals Service and Northern Virginia Juvenile Detention Center, U.S.
MARSHALS
SERV.,
https://www.usmarshals.gov/foia/IGAs_Cap_Agreements/virginia/n_va_juvenile.
pdf (last visited Aug. 29, 2020) (previewing an up-to-date contract with the U.S.
Marshal Service) [perma.cc/3LFM-ZMEH].
339. Telephone call by Mae Quinn to the Federal Judicial Data Hotline (July
31, 2020).
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about juvenile delinquency matters and that we might, instead,
direct our inquiry to local juvenile courts.340
Review of federal juvenile cases on Westlaw provides little
additional insight.341 One outlier, a reported federal delinquency
case out of Arizona, did indicate the youth was remanded to
AMIKids to participate in a residential sex offender program as
part of his disposition.342 Although it is unclear which facility was
used in that case, AMIKids has no facilities in Arizona but does
have some in Florida, including one closed by the state just weeks
ago based upon physical abuse on the part of staff.343 Thus one may
wonder about the quality of facilities being used in federal
delinquency matters and whether they are being adequately
monitored for trauma-informed, evidence-based practices.344
In addition, under the current confusing dispositional scheme
for
youth
adjudicated
delinquent
in
federal
court,
post-adjudication placements for youth may last many years.345
For juveniles who are adjudicated prior to their eighteenth
birthday, they may be held until age twenty one or for up to the
maximum sentence they would have faced as an adult, whichever
is shorter.346 If by happenstance their matter is not resolved until
after the juvenile turns eighteen, then the youth may be held in
federal custody for a longer determinate term—in some cases until

340. Id.
341. See Fagerstrom v. United States, 311 F.2d 717, 719 (8th Cir. 1963)
(stating that Fagerstrom was moved to a multitude of different detainment
facilities, but not providing details about the programming at each).
342. See United States v. J.D.T., 751 F. App’x 991, 993 (9th Cir. 2018)
(explaining that J.D.T. had his probation violated for failing to abide by conditions
of AMI’s residential treatment center for sex offenders, which prohibited
participants from engaging in even consensual sexual activity, as a result, the
youth had a custodial sentence imposed).
343. See Kavitha Surana & Suran Megan Reeves, State Suspends Operations
at AMIKids Pinellas After Child Sustains a Brain Bleed, TAMPA BAY TIMES, (Feb.
20, 2020) (explaining that AMIKids has 22 locations in Florida).
344. See id. (emphasizing the issues present at AMIKids nationwide).
345. See THE NAT’L ACAD. PRESS, supra note 326, at 159 (explaining a decision
that sentenced a fifteen-year-old to a state reformatory for an indeterminate
period).
346. See Doyle, supra note 174, at 15 (stating the typical holding periods for
juveniles who are adjudicated before they are eighteen); see also 18 U.S.C. § 5039
(2018) (setting out the standard level of care a juvenile receives in a facility).
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age twenty six.347 And after adjudicated juveniles turn twenty one
years old, they may be housed in federal prison facilities until the
end of their juvenile delinquency disposition. 348
It is well known that youth in confinement are some of the
most vulnerable youth in the country in light of the risk for
depression, mistreatment, and trauma.349 These concerns are even
greater now during the pandemic, where children in detention and
other secure placements may fear for their lives.350 As a result of
current conditions, many around the country are advocating for
the release of court-involved youth so that they may return to their
families and communities during these difficult days.351 News
media and other entities have shed a light on the plight of children
who remain incarcerated during this public health crisis. 352 Yet,
remarkably little has been said about the circumstances of youth
who are in federal custody.353 This may be because there is just no
347. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2018) (stating that a youth who is adjudicated will
be held in federal custody); see also Doyle, supra note 174, at 15 (explaining that
federal juvenile delinquency dispositions may also involve periods of probation or
post-release supervision, too, which presents concerns about further incarceration
based upon violations of such periods).
348. See FBOP Program Statement—Juvenile Delinquents, FED. BUREAU OF
PRISONS (Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5216_006.pdf (last
visited Aug. 30, 2020) (outlining possibilities for housing and placement in federal
delinquency cases in the form of an official memo) [perma.cc/2L5A-QQKE].
349. See, e.g., BARRY HOLMAN & JASON ZIEDENBERG, THE DANGERS OF
DETENTION: THE IMPACT OF INCARCERATION: THE IMPACT OF INCARCERATING YOUTH
IN DETENTION AND OTHER SECURE FACILITIES, JUST. POL’Y INST. (Nov. 28, 2006)
(warning that youth placement in secure settings can be counter-productive and
result in more negative behaviors on the part of young people); U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT PROGRAMS, CONCERNS REGARDING
ABUSE AND DEATH IN CERTAIN PROGRAMS FOR TROUBLED TEENS (2017) (reporting
on thousands of allegations of abuse by teens placed in residential treatment).
350. See JOSH ROVNER, COVID-19 IN JUVENILE FACILITIES (The Sentencing
Project, Aug. 25, 2020) (shedding light on known cases of COVID-19 in juvenile
detention facilities used by states and localities, and urging release to reduce
youth exposure to the potentially deadly disease).
351. See id. (explaining that many are encouraging the release of youth in
juvenile detention centers due to the COVID-19 pandemic).
352. See Erica L. Green, “Pacing and Praying”: Jailed Youths Seek Release
as Virus Spreads, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2020, at a1 (reporting on actions and
inactions of state juvenile justice systems relating to youth in confinement during
the COVID-19 pandemic).
353. Cf. Joseph Neff, Why Did it Take the Feds Weeks to Report COVID-19
Cases in Privately Run Prisons? THE MARSHALL PROJECT, May 8, 2020 (calling the
government’s response to COVID-19 outbreaks in prisons into question).
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clear sense of how many youthful offenders are held by federal
officials on delinquency matters—or where they are.354
VI. Conclusion
The United States has two juvenile justice systems—one state
and one federal.355 Yet few know that Article III district courts
have jurisdiction over cases where young people are charged with
federal crimes.356 Occasionally the press may cover a high-profile
federal juvenile matter where the youth has been charged as an
adult in connection with a serious crime.357 Otherwise, the public
hears almost nothing about cases in federal court that may involve
kids accused of wrongdoing.
But federal delinquency matters present an anomaly in the
juvenile justice system—one that demands greater attention.358 As
noted, judges, attorneys, and other staff in Article III courts are
not deeply involved in national conversations about best legal or
rehabilitative practices for court-involved kids.359 It is also unclear
exactly how many juvenile delinquency cases have been processed
in recent years and how such cases have been resolved.360 This
seems to be in part because there is not one entity or agency
engaged in careful record keeping and data collection for such
cases.361
354. See THE NAT’L ACAD. PRESS, supra note 326, at 153–55 (explaining the
complexities of the 51 different juvenile justice systems in the United States).
355. See id. at 155 (pointing out the differences between the jurisdictions of
the federal and state juvenile justice systems).
356. See, e.g., United States v. Juvenile Male, 595 F.3d 885, 906 (9th Cir.
2010) (upholding certification of juvenile charged with immigration relating
offense, whose case was heard before a federal magistrate rather than District
Court judge).
357. See DEPT. OF JUST., TRYING JUVENILES AS ADULTS: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE
TRANSFER LAWS AND REPORTING 12 (2011) (explaining that there is no national
data that tracks youth who have been tried as adults).
358. See THE NAT’L ACAD. PRESS, supra note 326, at 154 (emphasizing the
difference between being charged with delinquencies and being “found guilty”).
359. See id. at 154–55 (explaining the difficult balance between the best
interest of the juveniles and how to punish them accordingly).
360. See Sawyer, supra note 336, at 1 (drawing attention to inconsistencies
with the Bureau of Prisons data regarding youthful offenders).
361. See id. (pointing out the numerous agencies in charge of managing the
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The information that can be gleaned suggests most federal
delinquency cases involve immigrant or Native American youth.362
In addition, youthful offenders in such cases may be held in any
number of institutions or facilities while charges are pending or
after they are resolved—including federal prisons once the youth
age out of the federal juvenile system. 363 While many are now
advocating for the release of juvenile and youthful offenders in
state juvenile justice systems during the current COVID-19
pandemic, it does not appear that any investigation is underway
to ascertain how many such individuals may be confined in
connection with federal delinquency matters and similarly at
risk.364
To be sure, compared to the state juvenile justice system, the
federal juvenile system does not involve several thousands of cases
each year.365 It does appear that fewer youth have cases formally
processed in U.S. District Court in recent years than in decades
past.366 But even a small group of youth is worthy of our concern
and attention—and should receive the same oversight and
advocacy as provided for kids involved in state juvenile courts.367
In the end perhaps the history and mystery of these relatively
obscure proceedings suggests that the time has finally come to
simply remove all juvenile cases from Article III federal courts.

juvenile justice systems).
362. See id. (explaining that Black and Native American youth are
overrepresented in juvenile facilities).
363. See THE NAT’L ACAD. PRESS, supra note 326, at 154–55 (explaining that
different jurisdictions detain juveniles in differing institutions and facilities).
364. See Neff, supra note 353 (pointing out the lack of governmental
interference when the COVID-19 pandemic was disproportionately affecting
prison populations).
365. See THE NAT’L ACAD. PRESS, supra note 326, at 155 (“[T]he federal
government has jurisdiction over a small number of juveniles, such as those who
commit crimes on Indian reservations or in national parks.”).
366. See Sawyer, supra note 336, at 1 (drawing attention to legislative reform
for juvenile incarceration).
367. See HOLMAN & ZIEDENBERG, supra note 349, at 6 (warning that detention
can interrupt the natural process of “aging out of delinquency”).

